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**1AC Oil**

**Newest and most conclusive evidence proves Venezuela’s economic model is terminally unsustainable – investment is key**

**Caselli 9/5** (Irene Caselli, BBC reporter on the ground in Venezuela, citing Jose Manuel Puente, professor and advisor to the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración in macroeconomics, 9-5-13, “Venezuela's economic woes: Sabotage or mismanagement?,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23970027) BI

Theories abound in Venezuela regarding Tuesday's blackout which affected more than two-thirds of the country. While President Nicolas Maduro has accused political opponents of sabotaging the power system, the opposition blames government incompetence for the largest power cut in five years. As parts of the country are still facing problems with the electricity and the political finger-pointing continues, many are asking just how vulnerable Venezuela's infrastructure is. The capital, Caracas, is not used to the power cuts which have become quite common in other regions. On Tuesday, cash machines, traffic lights and the underground stopped working. There was traffic chaos, with some people stuck in train carriages. 'Lack of investment' Thousands of workers poured into the streets, with many finding it hard to make their way down from upper floors when emergency lamps turned out to be faulty. Jose Manuel Puente, an economist at the IESA School of Management, says the power cut is a sign of a wider malaise. "Unfortunately what happened on Tuesday is similar to what's happening to the country's entire infrastructure. Investment in certain areas has been reduced to minimum under [Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian] revolution," he explained. "What we see now is an inexorable consequence of over a decade of unbalanced economic policies." Most supporters of the late president and his successor Nicolas Maduro would not agree with Mr Puente's analysis. But even Finance Minister Nelson Merentes recently acknowledged that the economic policies followed by the government had not been successful. In a television interview broadcast on the weekend, he called for reforms to tackle structural economic problems. "This is a government that has won 18 elections, that has had social achievements," he told TV channel Televen. "But it still has to be successful on the economy." Oil riches Since Mr Chavez came to power in 1998, the government has succeeded in reducing inequality, poverty and malnutrition, according to various United Nations and World Bank indexes. Huge investment in the social sector, government subsidies and price controls on staple foods, fuelled by revenues from Venezuela's oil industry, have been behind its achievements in narrowing the gap between the rich and poor. Venezuela has the world's largest reserves of oil, which make up 95% of the country's total exports. The downside to some of these social-oriented policies has been that they created distortions in the economy, say analysts. One of the most controversial policies was brought in in 2003, when the government set a fixed rate for foreign currency exchange. The move was designed to keep government control over prices and to make certain basic items, such as bread and rice, more affordable to the poor. Black market Under the currency controls, people and businesses can receive US dollars at the official rate only by applying to a government currency agency, and then only for the purpose of importing goods or to pay for foreign travel. The amount of dollars available at the official rate is restricted, causing the black market to flourish. The official exchange rate is 6.30 bolivars to the dollar. On the black market, the exchange rate is six times higher. While changing money on the black market is a crime, finding traders is extremely easy and Venezuelans calculate their cost of living according to the black market exchange rates. "Every aspect of Venezuela's economy depends on the distortion of the market provoked by the fixed exchange rate," says Francisco Ibarra, a director at Econometrica, an economic think-tank close to the opposition. And some analysts on the other side of the political spectrum agree Venezuela's currency controls are problematic. "The fixed exchange rate is what has provoked most damage," acknowledges Victor Alvarez, a former minister of industry under Mr Chavez. "When the price of a currency remains frozen in time, while prices of goods and services go up … it creates a very harmful phenomenon," Mr Alvarez told Venezuelan financial newspaper El Mundo. When using the official market rate, Caracas is among the 10 most expensive cities in the world as measured by the Economist's 2013 Big Mac index. The index uses the price of a hamburger to compare living costs around the world. In Venezuela, a Big Mac will set you back over $10 (£6.40). Shortages Many say the fixed exchange rate is also to blame for other problems the Venezuelan economy is experiencing. Analysts say that imports become difficult because companies cannot access dollars. They say this, combined with an inadequate domestic production of food staples and dependence on imports, is creating shortages. According to the Central Bank, the scarcity index is currently at 18%, meaning that out of 100 goods, 18 are not available. Venezuela also suffers from the highest inflation rates in Latin America. Prices go up regularly for items that are not subsidised and protected by the government. Pineapples used to cost 20 bolivars in March ($3 on the official exchange rate), but now they are double that. Minimum wages have gone up, but not enough to catch up with the inflation. "Venezuela has the worst macroeconomic indicators in the entire region," says Mr Puente. "The lowest growth rates, the highest inflation and the highest shortages index." "Mr Merentes understands this very serious unbalance and the necessity for change. But this is also a political problem." Until his death, Mr Chavez had been hugely popular, winning four consecutive elections as president. Mr Maduro, who won April's election by a razor-thin margin, cannot command the same support his predecessor enjoyed.

**Specifically, oil income will drop nearly 4%**

**Tovar, 7/26** – won the Citi Journalism Award for Excellence 2012, head of the microeconomics desk at El Universal, a major Venezuelan newspaper headquartered in Caracas, translated by Conchita Delgado (Ernesto J., “Plunge of 3.8% expected in Venezuela's oil bill” El Universal, 26 July 2013, http://english.eluniversal.com/economia/130726/plunge-of-38-expected-in-venezuelas-oil-bill)//BI

The performance of Venezuelan oil exports in 2013 is not at all encouraging, as appears from the estimates in the oil and gas market. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistics arm of the US Department of Energy, estimated Venezuela's oil income at USD 30 billion in January-June 2013. The EIA numbers show a dataset since 2004, both for the face value and the real value, deducting inflation and taking FY2005 as the baseline (when the measurement started). Based on this endpoint, Venezuela seemingly received USD 25 billion in the first half of FY2013 for oil exports. Likewise, this leads to an income forecast of near USD 50 billion for 2013. If such forecast comes true, 2013 will end with a drop of 3.85% in the value of oil exports, compared with USD 52 billion in 2012. Both falling oil prices and the looming reduction of Venezuelan oil exports in the light of growing domestic demand of hydrocarbons play a key role in such decline. Venezuelan oil traded at USD 101.89 per barrel in the first half of 2013, substantially below USD 107.78 in the same period the previous year, or 5.46% less. Thus far this year, the Venezuelan oil basket averages USD 102.07, that is, 1.35% less than USD 103.42 in 2012.

**Negative trends are a result of growing state control of oil resources – that limits investment, restricts democracy and increases risk of oil shocks – U.S. action is key to reverse them**

**Goldwyn, 13** – President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (4/11/2013, David L., “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere; “Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf)

The unconventional revolution will also force the resource-endowed nations of the Western Hemisphere to develop more competitive investment frameworks. North America has become the investment destination of choice, with large markets, attractive fiscal terms, strong rule of law and respect for contract sanctity in the U.S and Canada. As will be discussed in greater depth, many Latin American countries are noted for resource nationalism, volatile investment frameworks, and political extremes rather than stability. In order for Latin America to compete, investment terms will have to improve and regulatory frameworks must be enforced with equity and consistency. In short, the southern half of the Hemisphere must prove that it can adapt to changing markets, resource bases and technologies in order to compete with the opportunities found in North America. The prospects for this adaptation are mixed, providing opportunities for U.S. energy diplomacy. II. Energy Trends in the Western Hemisphere The Western Hemisphere has seen the rise of two trends in energy governance in recent years. One trend is towards rising state control of energy resources – in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador in particular. The concern here is that this trend will limit the growth of global supplies of oil and gas by undermining the value of existing investments, discouraging future investment and leading to political instability resulting from declining living standards. The economic consequence of this trend is that the hemisphere will contribute less to the diversification of oil supply, thereby engendering a tighter international oil market more vulnerable to the negative effects of supply shocks, increasing the importance of OPEC supply and, over time, undermining economic development in the region. The political consequences of these trends include the decline of U.S. influence in the region relative to competing ideologies and the erosion of democratic structures. A second, much more positive, trend is towards creative fiscal regimes that welcome foreign investment and require state owned companies to compete with international companies, with independent regulators that promote fair and efficient regulation. Countries observing this model are increasing production or stalling the decline of existing reserves. Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru are key examples of this creative model. When I last testified on Latin American energy trends before Congress, Mexico was generally considered to be a part of the first group, making the net trend negative. Today, however, Mexico’s government is actively seeking reforms that include, but are certainly not limited to, the energy sector. A new question mark hangs over Brazil, however. While Petrobras had been viewed as an exemplar national oil company in recent years, it has recently seen its production estimates curtailed, and its market value tumble. The company is no longer second in value only to Exxon Mobil. Perhaps as a sign of changing regional dynamics, Petrobras is now reported to be worth less than Colombia’s national oil company, a development that would have been thought to be nearly unthinkable just a few years ago. 14 While natural gas production is rising, oil production is falling, as Petrobras has faced major challenges fulfill both its newfound responsibilities in the deep and ultra-deepwater subsalt resources, companies face challenges meeting aggressive local content requirements and Petrobras struggles to meet the political expectations of the government. Venezuela and Mexico are the most important oil exporters in the hemisphere. While Brazil, Colombia and Argentina are important destinations for foreign investment, and helpfully produce enough oil to meet their own domestic needs and make some contribution to the global export market, they are not strategic suppliers to the global market at this time. Only Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela produce more than a million barrels per day, although Colombian crude oil production rose as high as 944,310 barrels per day in 2012,15 and Federico Renjifo, the Colombian Energy and Mining Minister, has stated that the country expects to produce 1.01 mbd in 2013.16 Bolivia has enormous gas reserves, but exports mostly to Brazil and modestly to Argentina. Only Trinidad and Tobago is a key supplier to the world gas market. A. The Rise in State Control From those countries now committed to increasing state control, the U.S. faces two key challenges: the loss of production growth and diversity of supply from the region if new economic frameworks are unattractive to foreign investors and, most critically, the loss of U.S. influence vis-à-vis competing political visions. The Economic Impact of Rising State Control The recent wave of changes in contractual terms and dramatic changes in tax regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and, in recent years, Argentina, threatens to slow new investment and eventually deepen instability and poverty in these nations, as well as destroy shareholder value for the companies invested there. The deterioration in the investment climate for energy in these countries is primarily an economic threat, as it foments an environment where supply is constrained and prices are high. We are seeing the revision of economic terms at a time when producers rather than companies hold more market power. Venezuela In 2007, President Hugo Chavez led the nationalization of oil exploration and production in Venezuela, mandating renegotiation of contracts with a minimum 60 percent PdVSA share. While sixteen companies, including Shell and Chevron, complied with the new agreements, ExxonMobil and ENI refused to cooperate and were forcibly taken over. Both companies have pending complaints before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank that are expected to be decided in late 2013. As a result of those claims, particularly the ExxonMobil claim, Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID in 2012.17 The impact of the nationalizations, according to expert analysts like Deutsche Bank and Wood Mackenzie, was a massive flight of investment capital from Venezuela’s heavy oil sector to Canada’s oil sands, effectively freezing development of the hemisphere’s largest oil reserves during one of the greatest oil booms in history. The net impact on Venezuela’s credit and credibility are quite negative, again with serious negative long-term consequences for the global oil market and Venezuela’s own economy. In 2008, ENI and Total came reached an agreement with PdVSA regarding a 2005 joint venture requirement that they had not previously signed an MOU for. Terms for involvement in natural gas development in Venezuela are slightly more beneficial, although in 2012, the year before his death, President Chavez expressed some interest in altering those terms. It is generally expected that Venezuela’s oil production will continue to fluctuate or stagnate without considerable outside investment. According to the EIA, some analysts estimate that PdVSA must spend at least $3 billion annually in order to keep production at its current levels.18 Venezuela plays a significant role in the Western Hemisphere, acting as a proxy for Cuba and providing oil at favorable cost and financing terms to Caribbean nations through Petrocaribe and the Southern Cone through Petrosur, ventures which add stress to the country’s fiscal situation. While change is unlikely to happen quickly, pressure stemming from the recent failed currency devaluation, rising inflation, and vast external subsidies will take a toll on the economy and are ultimately unsustainable.

**Growing economic crises and ties with Iran are fueling narco terror networks targeting the U.S.**

**Shinkman, 13** – national security reporter at U.S. News and World Report (4/24/2013, Paul D., “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond? New Venezuelan president at a crossroads for major threat to U.S.,” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond)

At a conference earlier this month, top U.S. military officers identified what they thought would be the top threats to the U.S. as it draws down from protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. James Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, was unequivocal about a largely unreported danger: "Narco-terrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is going to play out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going to have to deal with." "Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," Amos continued. "They have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world." The commandant's remarks came a week before the April 14 election where Venezuelans chose a successor to the wildly popular and charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died March 5. Amos indicated the outcome of this election would define much of future relations between the U.S. and Venezuela, located on a continent that has rarely appeared on America's foreign policy radar in the last decade. Experts, analysts and pundits could not have predicted the election outcome: The establishment's Nicolas Maduro beat reformer Henrique Capriles by a margin of roughly 1 percent. Chavez's hand-picked successor inherited the presidency, but he would not enjoy a broad public mandate to get a teetering Venezuela back on track. The situation in the South American nation remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and increase social benefits. Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying widespread blackouts and food shortages. One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow world of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen expect. "Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybody else," says Doug Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime. He compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions to a problem. Anti-American groups can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example, or potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC, the Colombian guerilla organization, he says. "Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-night stand," says Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while dodging U.S. influence. But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere. Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the "growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. This alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central America to penetrate North American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S. The results of this access are largely secret, though security experts who spoke with U.S. News believe the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, D.C.'s Georgetown neighborhood was carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives. "Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian citizens that come and go to these countries," wrote Farah of countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama. He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press conference in Tehran in 2010, "We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism." These relationships are controlled by a group of military elites within Venezuela, Farah tells U.S. News. He wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote Maduro won in the April 14 election gives him enough support to keep the country – and its shadow commerce – stable enough to continue its usual business. "[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." "Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez.

**Results in WMD terrorism on the U.S.**

**Anderson, 8** – AP writer, citing Charles Allen, former chief of intelligence analysis at the Department of Homeland Security (Curt, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,” USA Today, 8 October 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709\_x.htm)

MIAMI — There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S. "The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the United States," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. "The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them." Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum to come together."

**Retaliation risks extinction**

**Wright 7** – New America Foundation senior fellow (Robert, 4/28, Planet Of The Apes, http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/opinion/28wright.html)

(3) Terrorism. Alas, the negative-feedback loop -- bad outcomes lead to smart policies -- may not apply here. We reacted to 9/11 by freaking out and invading one too many countries, creating more terrorists. With the ranks of terrorists growing -- amid evolving biotechnology and loose nukes -- we could within a decade see terrorism on a scale that would make us forget any restraint we had learned from the Iraq war's outcome. If 3,000 deaths led to two wars, how many wars would 300,000 deaths yield? And how many new terrorists? Terrorism alone won't wipe out humanity. But with our unwitting help, it could strengthen other lethal forces. It could give weight to the initially fanciful ''clash of civilizations'' thesis. Muslim states could fall under the control of radicals and opt out of what might otherwise have become a global civilization. Armed with nukes (Pakistan already is), they would revive the nuclear Armageddon scenario. A fissure between civilizations would also sabotage the solution of environmental problems, and the ensuing eco-calamity could make people on both sides of the fissure receptive to radical messages. The worse things got, the worse they'd get. So while no one of the Big Three doomsday dynamics is likely to bring the apocalypse, they could well combine to form a positive-feedback loop, a k a the planetary death spiral. And the catalyst would be terrorism, along with our mishandling of it.

**Expanding market based investment is essential to Venezuelan stability and Maduro’s grip on power**

**Campbell, 13** – editor of Alberta Oil (Darren, “A new leader could signal change for Venezuela’s troubled oil and gas sector; If Nicolas Maduro can reverse the industry's decline, it could siphon off investment in Alberta's oil sands,” 16 April 2013, http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2013/04/a-new-leader-could-signal-change-for-venenzuelas-oil-and-gas-sector/)

That’s because Venezuelan heavy oil is a competitor to the bitumen and heavy oil Alberta produces, and as long as the Venezuelan oil and gas industry is badly underperforming, some of the investment that could be going to develop its reserves will flow to the oil sands. But now that Maduro is the new boss in Venezuela, is he likely to reverse the decline? Devon Energy Big Box To gain some insight into that question, I contacted Roger Tissot – a native of Colombia who is now a British Columbia-based industry consultant who specializes in South America. Last June, Tissot wrote an essay on Chavez and the future of the Venezuela oil and gas industry that appeared in Alberta Oil. Maduro was Chavez’s hand-picked successor, and knowing that, Tissot says no one should expect a drastic reversal of policies – or a drastic turnaround in the industry’s fortunes. However, the status quo can’t continue, either. Maduro needs oil and gas revenue to fund the country’s social programs and keep the country from falling into chaos. A better run, more free market-leaning oil and gas industry will help Maduro accomplish this and keep him in power longer. Therefore, Tissot thinks Maduro has little choice but to shake things up when it comes to oil and gas matters. “One could expect a government more accessible to foreign investments, and foreign investors concerns (rule of law, security of payments, stability of contracts.) Although it is too early to say, one should expect the Venezuelan oil sectors – after years of stagnation and mismanagement – to perhaps start showing some signs of life again,” he wrote in an email exchange. “How soon and how deep is something that will depend on how Mr. Maduro’s administration performs.

**Instability spills over to rest of the region**

**Shifter, 3** – vice president for policy at the Inter-American Dialogue (Michael, “Why Venezuela Matters,” 16 July 2003, http://nationalinterest.org/article/why-venezuela-matters-2388?page=1)

For the United States, Venezuela is not just another Latin American country in turmoil. It is, after all, the fourth largest oil supplier to the United States, accounting for 15 percent of its oil imports. Senior US officials point to oil as the overriding interest in Venezuela. In the wake of US military action in Iraq, and the tremendous uncertainty in the Middle East, one would think that Venezuela would acquire even greater urgency for the United States. Oil works both ways, however. Shrewdly, the Chavez government allows the oil to flow precisely to avoid antagonizing foreign operations and, especially, the United States. Oil aside, there are other key U.S. interests at play in Venezuela, though these are less widely recognized. Regional stability and security top the list. The five countries that make up the Andean region of South America are particularly convulsed. Continued chaos and escalating violence in Venezuela would not only inflict damage on the country itself, but could well undermine the ability of neighboring countries to achieve and maintain social peace. In this regard, Colombia deserves special mention. The United States has long sought to bolster the Colombian government's efforts to extend state authority and control. Since 1999, Colombia has received some $2.5 billion in security aid from the United States, making it the largest beneficiary outside of the Middle East. Yet, there has been increasing violence on the Colombia/Venezuela border involving Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces - and even Venezuela's armed forces. Should the Venezuelan crisis become a military conflagration, the resulting instability would be detrimental to longstanding US policy objectives. The conditions are combustible, and the risks are growing.

**The impact is global hegemonic war**

**Rochlin 94** – Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University College (James Francis, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”, p. 130-131)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Investment in Venezuela trades off with Canadian oil sands**

**Campbell, 13** – editor of Alberta Oil (Darren, “A new leader could signal change for Venezuela’s troubled oil and gas sector; If Nicolas Maduro can reverse the industry's decline, it could siphon off investment in Alberta's oil sands,” Alberta Oil, 16 April 2013, http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2013/04/a-new-leader-could-signal-change-for-venenzuelas-oil-and-gas-sector/)

Oil-rich Venezuela has a new president and his name is Nicolas Maduro. On Monday, Maduro was declared the winner of the closest presidential election the country has had in 45 years. He succeeds Hugo Chavez, who died of cancer on March 5. Normally, we wouldn’t write about the results of an election from a far-off outpost like Venezuela here at Energy Ink. But Venezuela isn’t just any outpost. It has some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. And under Chavez, the industry and the state-run company, the Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA), have been run badly. That, of course, has been good for Alberta’s own oil and gas industry, particularly the oil sand sector. That’s because Venezuelan heavy oil is a competitor to the bitumen and heavy oil Alberta produces, and as long as the Venezuelan oil and gas industry is badly underperforming, some of the investment that could be going to develop its reserves will flow to the oil sands.

**Impact is extinction from runaway climate change**

**Hansen, 12** – directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (James, “Game Over for the Climate,” New York Times, 9 May 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html?\_r=0)

GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview with President Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said that Canada would exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves “regardless of what we do.” If Canada proceeds, and we do nothing, it will be game over for the climate. Canada’s tar sands, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk.That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels. If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground.

**U.S. energy engagement solves – political and economic changes make Maduro’s acceptance likely**

**Shifter, 13** – Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service (Michael, “The Empire Makes Nice: Is it time for a Venezuela reset?,” Foreign Policy 11 March 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the\_empire\_makes\_nice\_venezuela\_hugo\_chavez)

Four years ago, when the first Obama administration was still hopeful about the prospects of resetting relationships with U.S. adversaries in the world, Venezuela was high on the list. "Eight years of isolation has resulted in the kinds of outreach that, I think, both you and I find troubling," then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the Senate in 2009. "Our belief is, if it hasn't worked, why keep it going? Let's see what else might be possible." Things haven't turned out quite as planned, but following the death of Hugo Chávez, the United States may get a new opportunity to improve one of its most frustrating relationships, and find out if a new way of operating might indeed be possible. Some progress has been made, of course. The Obama administration learned some important lessons from the George W. Bush years. It wisely avoided becoming embroiled in rhetorical tit-for-tats -- a game Chávez played with relish and of which he was the undisputed master. In 2006, for instance, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld likened Chávez to Adolf Hitler. The Venezuelan president responded in kind at a rally in Caracas, "The imperialist, genocidal, fascist attitude of the U.S. president has no limits. I think Hitler would be like a suckling baby next to George W Bush." The Obama White House also seemed to accept the fact that, for all his faults and the problems he posed for the United States, Chávez was Venezuela's legitimately elected president. Had there been another attempt to oust him, Obama officials would, one hopes, not have expressed undisguised glee, as the Bush White House did during the brief putsch of 2002. Seven years after that failed coup attempt, and three months into his presidency, Obama shook hands and bantered a bit with Chávez at a hemispheric summit in Trinidad and Tobago. (Chávez, ever the showman, gave Obama a copy of a book by leftist historian Eduardo Galeano, a gift presumably aimed at enlightening the incoming president about the evils of U.S. imperialism.) True, Obama has eschewed Bush's military adventurism, which touched a deep nerve in Latin America. But a more restrained U.S. foreign policy and a commitment to "engage" with the region as "partners" did little to persuade Chávez that Washington had changed its tutelary ways. "Obama, to me, until now, has been a great disappointment." Chavez told CNN in 2010, comparing the U.S. president to a highly rated baseball pitching prospect who "end up being wild." Today, three months into Obama's second term, Washington will have to deal with a Venezuela -- a country with the world's largest oil reserves that accounts for roughly 10 percent of U.S. imports today -- without Chávez. No one can match the riveting theater Chávez reliably provided -- his trademark, strident rhetoric and audacious, provocative moves on the regional and global stages, so often targeted at Washington. Still, after 14 years of distancing and mutual suspicions, the U.S.-Venezuela relationship is sure to be very difficult. Though uncertainty abounds in the country that Chávez so thoroughly dominated for so long, the most likely scenario is that acting President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez's designated successor, will win the election scheduled for April 14. He will benefit from an emotional boost from Chavez's death and a demoralized opposition that that was thrown off balance by major defeats in presidential and gubernatorial elections in late 2012. Maduro will preside over a government made up of diverse factions that, absent Chávez's charisma and political shrewdness, will have a hard time staying together -- particularly as the country's already serious economic conditions worsen. The Obama administration should take two critical facts about Venezuela's post-Chávez political reality into account. First, since Maduro is not Chávez, he will have little choice but to govern in a different fashion than his predecessor. Lacking comparable magnetism and resources, Maduro will likely be somewhat more accommodating to those Chávez treated with utter intransigence, such as the private sector, foreign investors, and the opposition. Maduro, acting out of self-interest, will need, and look for, political oxygen.The second is simply the risk of turbulence in Venezuela, especially after the upcoming electoral cycle. To be sure, analysts' occasional predictions about political violence during the Chávez years were (happily) not borne out. And given the extent of rancor and polarization in the society, it is striking how little political violence there has been (common crime, on the other hand, has skyrocketed). Still, the security situation is far from settled -- a militia force of 125,000 answered directly to Chávez -- and it would be a mistake to rule out chaotic and perilous scenarios that should be of great concern to the entire hemisphere. What does this mean for Washington? Assuming that Maduro succeeds Chávez, the Obama administration should be amenable to taking steps toward establishing a better relationship with Caracas. Since the relationship today is practically nonexistent, that would not require a big leap.It might simply entail opening up channels of communication and seeking to establish an ambassadorial presence in both capitals which -- absurdly, given the strong commercial relationship between the two countries -- have not existed since 2010. Beyond that, depending on how Venezuela's economic situation unfolds, it might be worth exploring some degree of cooperation and support in energy. Under Chávez, Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA has suffered from declining production and investment and heavy politicization. Maduro may not want to change that right away -- he will need to show that he is a loyal Chávista. But if the country's fiscal pressures prove untenable, he may have few options, and the United States should be open to helping out. Collaboration on counternarcotics and law enforcement would also be desirable but for the time being are probably non-starters politically, given the depth of mutual mistrust (not to mention that seven Venezuelan officials are on a Treasury Department blacklist for their alleged involvement in drugs and arms dealing). To its credit, the State Department reached out to Maduro several months ago, and following Chávez's death the Obama administration has expressed an interest in improving the tense bilateral relationship. Its entreaty was surely not helped by Maduro's broadside against the United States, just hours before he announced that Chávez had died -- a move right out of Hugo's playbook. Maduro not only expelled two military attaches from the U.S. Embassy but also intimated that Washington might have been responsible in some way for Chávez's death. Absent a shred of evidence, Maduro's words were outrageous, but aimed at proving to the base that he was a worthy heir to Chávez before the election. But it's far too early for the United States to give up hope on Maduro. Despite his reckless words in recent days, his ideologically hard-line views, and close relationship with Cuban leaders, Maduro's style contrasts sharply with Chávez's. Chávez was a military man, a former paratrooper who attempted a coup in 1992. Maduro was not only foreign minister and head of the National Assembly, but earlier in his career was a union official who negotiated deals. He will be tough rhetorically, but some give-and-take behind the scenes seems feasible -- a balancing act Washington will have to understand and deal with. Maduro will likely also confront more dire economic circumstances than Chávez ever did. Politically, he will not be able to afford to reject communication and some accommodation with the private sector.In fact, Maduro has been instrumental in the Venezuelan government's constructive role in current peace talks in Havana between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). His support to what is arguably Washington's closest South American ally in an effort to bring to an end the only remaining armed conflict in the hemisphere can be construed as an example of his pragmatism. A peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC (which uses Venezuelan territory as a sanctuary and was supported by Chávez) would reduce a key source of instability in the wider region. To anticipate potential turmoil in Venezuela in the coming period, Washington should be consulting regularly and at the highest levels with South American allies, especially Colombia and Brazil, who have the most at stake should the security situation deteriorate. Although many commentators have drawn attention to Cuba's role in the Venezuelan transition, and have particularly highlighted Cuba's huge dependence on Venezuelan oil and money, Brazil will probably end up being just as influential as the situation unfolds. South America's undisputed superpower -- whose leverage on Venezuela stems from key exports, especially food, and political backing -- is chiefly interested in maintaining social peace within its own neighborhood In keeping with Brazil's own governance and political evolution in recent years, Brasilia will aim to keep the situation in Venezuela under control and to encourage moderation, gradualism, and communication on both sides. It does not want trouble on its borders. Venezuela's recent entry into the Brazil-led MERCOSUR trade group will makes this issue of even greater concern for President Dilma Rousseff's government. In this respect, there is ample coincidence of interests between Washington and Brasília. Absent Chávez, Venezuela will continue to be tricky in the second Obama administration. The administration will need to arrive at a more accurate on-the-ground reading of what is happening in the country. It will need to engage in quiet, steady, high-level diplomacy with key allies in the region not only to closely monitor the security situation and guard against dire scenarios but to press for free and fair elections and adherence to the rule of law. None of this will be easy, and recent history is not encouraging. But Chávez is gone, and although for now some measure of continuity in Venezuela is most likely, conditions of scarcity -- in charisma, money, and political astuteness -- will soon be acutely felt. It is important not to forget that Chávez was able to do what he did for 14 years for a simple reason -- because he could.

**U.S. resources and expertise are key**

**Farnsworth, 13** – vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society (Eric, “Energy Security Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean, Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 11 April 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-FarnsworthE-20130411.pdf)

More broadly, the United States has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in the hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting models that reduce the negative if unintended consequences of regional energy development, including a lack of transparency and official corruption, the distorting impact of consumption subsidies, an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, environmental concerns, and a concentration of wealth and political power around the sector. In order to develop their respective industries, nations need U.S. technology, management expertise, and investment dollars. They need our education system to develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to understand regulatory, tax, and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best practices in environmental mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the investment climate and the rule of law.

**1AC Plan**

**Thus, the United States federal government should substantially increase its investment and technical aid for Venezuela’s liberalization of its energy sector.**

**1AC Relations**

**Large-scale rapprochement is possible but not occurring now – oil investment could catalyze stronger relations**

**Metzker, 13** – IPS News writer, citing Shifter and Diana Villiers Negroponte, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute (Jared, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” 17 June 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/,)

A shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela may be pending as a bilateral rapprochement suddenly appears more possible than it has in years. On the sidelines of talks held earlier this month in Guatemala by the Organisation of American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua, with Kerry’s subsequent statements indicating that relations could be heading in a friendlier direction. “We agreed today – both of us, Venezuela and the United States – that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that,” Kerry said following the meeting with Jaua, which was reportedly requested by the Venezuelans. The meeting happened on the heels of the release of Timothy Tracy, a U.S. filmmaker whom Venezuela had been holding on accusations of espionage. His release was interpreted by many as an “olive branch” being offered by the new Venezuelan government of Nicholas Maduro, whose presidency Washington still has not formally recognised. Only months ago, before the death of Venezuela’s long-time socialist leader Hugo Chavez, any normalisation of relations between Venezuela and the United States seemed highly unlikely. In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power by a military coup d’état that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had known was imminent. Chavez immediately accused the United States of having played a part in the event. After his suspicions were confirmed partly valid, his rhetoric grew more scathing. In 2006, he famously told the United Nations General Assembly that then-U.S. President George W. Bush was “the devil himself”. Following Chavez’s death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former vice-president, has not been as vitriolic in his posturing vis-à-vis the United States. According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”. “Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one,” Shifter told IPS. The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes. In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base. Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela’s parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency. Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable. Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation. Oil economy Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies. While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure. In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites. “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.” If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms. “Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time,” Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.” Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels. Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as “a small step”) was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.“I don’t think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas,” he said. “It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going.”

**Oil nationalization has undermined diplomatic relations**

**Daly, 13** – non-resident Fellow at The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies’ Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and one of the leading specialists on the post-Soviet space, particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia energy issues, having provided professional audiences with in-depth analysis of energy issues there for more than a decade (John, “Venezuelan President Maduro Offers Olive Branch to Washington,” 28 May 2013, http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/05/venezuelan-president-maduro-offers-olive-branch-to-washington)

To say that U.S. relations with Venezuela’s former President Hugo Rafael Chávez grew increasingly strained would be an understatement. But Chávez succumbed to cancer on 5 March, and the winds of change are blowing through Caracas. Why was Chávez in Washington’s bad books? His choice of allies, which included the Russian Federation, Iran and Cuba, but worse still were the social programs that Chávez implemented to benefit his people, which were socialist in nature, anathema to Washington’s proscriptions. But, tying the U.S. and Venezuela together like Siamese twins is – oil. According to the U.S. Energy Administration, Venezuela is the fourth largest provider of crude oil imports to the U.S., averaging 930 thousand barrels per day. In itscountry report on Venezuela the EIA succinctly noted, “Venezuela contains some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the world. It consistently ranks as one of the top suppliers of oil to the U.S. Venezuela is one of the world’s largest exporters of crude oil and the largest in the Western Hemisphere. The oil sector is of central importance to the Venezuelan economy. As a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Venezuela is an important player in the global oil market.” Venezuela has the largest conventional oil reserves and the second-largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere and two years ago OPEC reported that of the organization’s 81.33 percent of the globe’s known oil reserves Venezuela had 24.8 percent, exceeding Saudi Arabia with 22.2 percent. According to state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) figures, Venezuela currently has 77.5 billion barrels of oil reserves, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. PDVSA has a production capacity, including its strategic associations and operating agreements, of 4 million barrels per day, the highest production capacity in the Western Hemisphere. To fund his social programs, Chávez was determined to bring the country’s oil sector under government control, putting him into direct conflict with Washington’s belief in free markets. Venezuela’s oil industry had been under private control until 1974, when Venezuela nationalized it, setting up PDVSA. Venezuela’s oil production is centered in the Orinoco Oil Belt, which analysts believe contains the world’s largest reserves of extra-heavy oil, with an estimated 300 billion recoverable barrels. In the 1990s PDVSA began a so-called “oil opening,” where it allowed more and more foreign private companies to extract oil, via majority shares in joint ventures and the operating agreements. But difficulties began with Washington in February 2007, when Chávez announced a new law to nationalize the last remaining oil production sites that are under foreign company control, to take effect on 1 May. Under the law, which allowed foreign companies to negotiate the nationalization terms, earlier joint ventures, involving ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Statoil, ConocoPhillips, and BP, were transformed to give PDVSA a minimum 60 percent stake. The process completed a government initiative begun in 2005, when the Chavez administration transformed earlier “operating agreements” in Venezuela’s older oil fields into joint ventures with a wide variety of foreign companies. Thirty out of 32 such operating agreements were transformed, with most foreign companies accepting the new arrangements, but ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused, instituting lawsuits for compensation that continue to this day. The policies had repercussions in the diplomatic sphere. On 28 June 2010 President Obama nominated Palmer as U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela but three months later Chávez announced on his weekly TV program that he would not allow Larry Palmer to take up his post after Palmer told a US senator that morale in the Venezuelan army was low and that members of Chávez’s government had ties to leftist FARC Colombian rebels. On 28 December Chávez flatly refused to accept Palmer because of his derogatory remarks and the following day the U.S. revoked the accreditation of Venezuelan ambassador, Bernardo Álvarez Herrera. And there relations have remained until now, even as oil sales have continued unabated.

**Engagement with Venezuela specifically is key to credibility**

**Griffin, 13** – Harvard editorial writer (John, “Engage with Venezuela,” The Harvard Crimson, 3 April 2013, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)

Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America. Chávez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America.

**This is critical to boost U.S. influence and mold the regional economic framework**

**Goldwyn, 13** – President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (4/11/2013, David L., “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere; “Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf)

III. The Impact of Hemispheric Energy Trends on U.S. Foreign Policy The tight oil boom will produce competitive pressure on the region’s oil and gas producers. If global oil prices soften, revenues could fall significantly and put major fiscal pressure on governments highly dependent on resource revenues for their budgets. The market will impact these economies far more than any U.S. policy can. But there will be a debate over economic frameworks in the hemisphere, and the U.S. should be a part of it. While U.S. influence in the hemisphere has waned in key areas in recent years, our ability to help these economies revive through energy investment, and to grow through more competitive energy feed stocks can help change this pattern if we take advantage of it. We have key strategic partners in the region including Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. We can effectively use trade as a tool for good, as witnessed by the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. We need to appreciate the salience of legitimate regional issues like poverty and advocate how our economic and political models can alleviate them. Examples of this are addressing trade barriers to agricultural imports, expanding educational opportunities in the U.S. for future leaders, improving the visa application process, dealing with migration issues with Mexico in a spirit of respect and fairness, supporting World Bank and Inter American Development Bank infrastructure programs in the hemisphere, supporting the development of civil society and the capacity of democratic institutions, and treating our relations with our hemispheric neighbors as intrinsically important, not as litmus tests of loyalty to the U.S. on issues external to the region itself. In countries where we face ideological competition, it is crucial that we do not abandon the field. We need to increase our diplomatic engagement and defend our way of thinking. A. Uncertainty in Venezuela Venezuela has long been seen as the leader of a regional group of states seeking to wage an ideological and political competition for regional influence with the U.S. Yet the death of President Chavez, whose charisma has long been regarded as a key facet of the Bolivarian narrative, and Venezuela’s growing economic problems, which were recently reflected by the government’s efforts to devalue the currency by more than 30% against the dollar, have led some observers to believe that the influence of the Venezuelan model has peaked. Many are now forecasting that the Brazilian economic model, which still provides for a generous state role in the economy, yet does so in a more market-friendly and democratic context, will gain clout among states in the region that remain skeptical of liberal economics and the Washington consensus. In the wake of Hugo Chavez’s death, many questions remain about whether political change is possible in Venezuela itself. Indeed, the opposition candidate in the April 14 election to succeed Chavez, Henrique Capriles, is a vocal adherent of the Brazilian model that many say is gaining regional traction. Yet it is widely assumed that Chavez’ handpicked successor, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, will win the election. Several divergent prognostications have been made regarding what a Maduro Presidency would entail for the U.S. While some perceive Maduro as a pragmatist who may be amenable to normalizing bilateral ties, others believe that he will be eager to prove his Bolivarian credentials to Chavez’s constituency and reject any U.S. entreaties to reengage. Still others doubt whether he will be able to retain the Presidency at all should the economic situation deteriorate further. Diosdado Cabello, a fellow Chavez adherent who is President of the National Assembly and is reported to be a popular figure among the Venezuelan Armed Forces, is commonly cited as an individual capable of seizing the Presidency, potentially through forcible means, should an opportunistic situation present itself. The manner in which the next Venezuelan President manages Venezuela’s oil wealth will have significant implications for international oil markets, which remain fairly tight due to supply disruptions in geopolitical hotspots Iran, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria. In February 2012, the Economist estimated that international markets have lost 1.25 million barrels per day as a result of these and other recent supply disruptions.28 Venezuela is an even more significant player in international markets; EIA estimates that it exports around 1.7 million barrels of crude per day.29 The impacts on Venezuela’s own economy will also be very profound, as Venezuela’s economy is far from diversified and remains nearly entirely dependent on the oil sector. In recent years, PdVSA’s exploration and production capital expenditures have not been sufficient to reverse production declines in the country’s mature conventional fields or to harness the country’s massive oil sands reserves in the Orinoco Belt. These unconventional resources are thought to account for around 90% of Venezuela’s remaining proven oil reserves. In order to maintain production at a reasonable clip, the next Venezuelan President will have to improve the country’s oil and gas investment regime to attract international firms with expertise in enhanced oil recovery techniques in conventional fields and in the unique, challenging technical requirements for producing the extra heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt, and that also have the resources to alleviate massive infrastructure bottlenecks that plague the oil sands production. It is hard to be optimistic about Venezuela’s near term prospects. Canadian heavy crudes are likely to fulfill a greater share of the US need for heavy crude. While heavy coking refinery capacity is growing world wide, Venezuela will face a challenging market for its crudes and lower profit margins as the distance to market will grow. B. The Status of Current Dialogues The US has had a number of bilateral and multilateral energy policy forums in the hemisphere over the years. These forums are platforms to understand market dynamics, share best practices on energy efficiency and conservation, share understanding on ways to enhance energy production, and exchange views on how a nation’s energy policies may be enhanced or reformed to promote the nation’s own policy. These policy dialogues are also essential for building the understanding and relationships that are essential for trade promotion and conflict resolution. Numerous dialogues and programs have been enacted since 2008, when I wrote that engagement with the Western Hemisphere needed to be renewed. Among those are a number of programs and initiatives aimed at energy relations. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA) was founded at the invitation of President Obama following the April 2009 Summit of the Americas, hosted in Trinidad and Tobago. ECPA was intended to focus on issues including energy efficiency, renewable energy, cleaner and more efficient use of fossil fuels, energy poverty, and infrastructure, and Secretary of State Clinton later proposed expanding the focus to include sustainable forests and land use and climate change adaptation. ECPA brings together governments and public and private sector partners to implement initiatives and complete projects, and boasts numerous initiatives in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Among the ECPA Initiatives are the Colombia Biomass Initiative, which aims to develop a technological plan for the production of energy from agroindustrial biomass, and the Chile Renewable Energy Center, which is intended to serve as a tool and resource for the region as it seeks to increase its use of renewable fuels. Both projects are undertaken in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy, which provides technical assistance and opportunities for collaborative work. Numerous dialogues exist today between the U.S. and Brazil. The U.S.-Brazil Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED), a presidential-level partnership aiming to deepen energy cooperation between the two nations, is one of the most significant. Strengthening energy security, the creation of new jobs and industries and reduction of carbon emissions are key goals of the SED. Major topics of the dialogue include biofuels, renewables and the sustainable development of oil and gas resources. The US has a trilateral energy policy dialogue with Canada and Mexico, which has addressed electric power, energy conservation, harmonization of standards and market outlooks. It has taken many forms, but it functions very well. In May 2012 the U.S., Mexico, Canada Map of Potential Carbon Dioxide Storage Capacity was released, identifying capacity in North America for at least 500 years worth of carbon dioxide emissions. The “New North American Carbon Storage Atlas” was created through the North American Carbon Atlas Partnership, and was developed by DOE, Natural Resources Canada, and the Mexican Ministry of Energy. We have many paths for cooperation. What we need now is a sharper focus on what we should prioritize, so we can maximize our impact and make the most of the limited engagement of our senior officials. IV. Energy Security Opportunities for the U.S. The Committee is wise to see the unique period of opportunity that the massive changes in oil and gas markets have created for U.S. foreign policy. While we will be more self-sufficient at home, our national security will still depend on a diverse global supply of oil gas, one able to withstand the inevitable disruptions we will face. If we can take this moment to help the hemisphere increase its own self sufficiency, wean itself from high carbon fuels, access more cost competitive feed stocks for power and transportation, and reduce dependence on subsidized Venezuelan fuel oil, we will have helped our own national security interests and helped to foster a freer, more prosperous, and more climate secure hemisphere. Here I offer six steps that the United States can take to meet its energy security goals in the Hemisphere. 1. Sustain Efforts Aimed at Energy Efficiency and the Adoption of Biofuels and Renewable Technologies Lowering global carbon emissions in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change is an important step towards ensuring global energy security. Latin America is highly dependent upon fossil fuels for its energy needs, most notably oil, coal and natural gas. Fuel oil is still a frequently used fuel for power generation, in spite of the fact that it is relatively inefficient and particularly bad for the environment. Hydropower has long been the favored form of renewable energy in Latin America, but changing weather patterns and droughts have prevented it from being fully reliable. The United States has, as described above, undertaken initiatives aimed at expanding the spread of biofuels and renewables in the Western Hemisphere, and this should remain a priority. The expiration of the U.S. tariff on imported biofuels was a step in the right direction, and more can be done to develop biofuels industries in Latin America. The development of new industries, clean energy research centers and government policies incentivizing the use of renewable technologies for power generation will help to build long-term, sustainable industries in the Hemisphere. Regardless of the power source used, energy efficiency is a worthwhile goal for Latin America. The IEA noted in the World Energy Outlook 2012 that while energy intensity is not particularly high in Latin America, it is primarily because high energy intensity in energy producing nations is offset by low energy use in energy importing nations. Improving energy efficiency, particularly in energy producing nations, will permit more efficient use of energy resources, allowing them to stretch farther. Existing forums like the ECPA already have energy efficiency as an issue of focus and can aid in connecting companies that represent successful and proven efficiency technologies with partners in Latin America. 2. Propagate Advanced Production Technologies Abroad Latin America has significant reserves of oil and gas, including potentially huge unconventional resources. One of the fastest, and perhaps easiest, ways for the U.S. to ensure diversification of energy supplies is to help other nations take advantage of the unconventional energy revolution. This will mean sharing technology, building regulatory regimes, improving environmental safety standards and possibly even developing infrastructure in nations with shale gas and tight oil reserves. The U.S. should continue to expand upon the work that the Department of State and partner agencies are attempting to achieve through UGTEP, offering technical, regulatory, geological and other support to countries that want to develop their shale oil and gas resources. There are also roles for companies to play, sharing their technology and technical expertise through partnerships, investment opportunities or service contracts. Helping other nations develop their domestic resources will increase global energy security by increasing and diversifying global supply. Natural gas is also, as far as fossil fuels go, a relatively low-carbon source of energy, and the expansion of the shale gas boom may offset global coal consumption and carbon emissions, serving as a boon for climate goals as well. By helping other nations, such as Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, adapt to changing energy markets and complex new sources of energy, the U.S. will be simultaneously ensuring its own energy security. 3. Research Ways to Encourage Gas Penetration in the Caribbean With abundant natural gas supply a short distance from the Caribbean, the US should look for ways to back out fuel oil and gasoline as a feedstock for power and transportation. While these nations are trying to maximize renewable energy, they still need a non-intermittent source of power generation. But short driving distance makes CNG or other natural gas technologies a real possibility. The key challenges are moving gas to small islands, ensuring storage or other means of security of supply, and identifying the right forms of vehicle technology. How to make this transition economically is a question for engineers as well as policymakers. The U.S. should design ways that private foundations, in tandem with our national laboratories and perhaps the OAS, can look for near-term, practical ways to increase natural gas utilization. Combined with a permissive policy on natural gas exports to the Caribbean, this could be major step forward for climate and national security for the Caribbean. 4. Reconsider the U.S. Policy Regarding Oil and Gas Exports and Swaps In light of the unconventional revolution, the U.S. will have surpluses of natural gas and even light oil, given that the domestic refining system is primarily configured to process heavy oil. Large price differentials also exist for U.S. resources, largely as a result of infrastructure and policy constraints that keep them trapped in the U.S. Current U.S. policy only permits the export of crude oil in highly limited circumstances. A careful reconsideration of U.S. export policy, particularly towards oil, may be warranted. Allowing some exports or swaps of light oil produced in the U.S. for the heavy oil needed for refineries would enable us to supply our hemispheric neighbors, increase export earnings, and sustain domestic job growth. Granting an additional avenue for sale of energy resources, either oil or gas, will also ensure that artificial barriers to export don’t lead to decreased production, high domestic prices and lost value to the economy, while simultaneously adding to global energy supply stability and security. The hemisphere can also benefit from additional exports of natural gas. Mexico imports costly LNG at oil-linked prices. The Caribbean is dependent on fuel oil for power generation and Brent prices gasoline for transportation. These exports could present a political advantage as well as an economic one, granting the U.S. with another tool to use in the Western Hemisphere, where Venezuelan influence is cemented by subsidized sales of crude oil and products. 5. Complete the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Agreement On February 20, 2012, the U.S. and Mexico signed a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement that allows for the joint the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico.30 If implemented, the agreement would end the current moratorium on exploration and production in the border area. While the Mexican Senate ratified the agreement on April 12, 2012, the Obama Administration has not formally submitted the agreement to the U.S. Congress for passage. The entry into force of this agreement would render significant benefits for both the U.S. and Mexico.31 It would provide a means for Pemex to collaborate with private companies in the Gulf of Mexico border area, which would give Pemex a crucial opportunity to gain expertise in deepwater activities that could be applied to the firm’s operations throughout Mexico. This would serve U.S. interests by boosting Mexican production and reducing U.S. dependence on imports from more politically troublesome regions, which have replaced lagging Mexican exports in recent years.32 Conversely, U.S. reticence to implement the agreement may send the wrong signal to Mexico and dampen enthusiasm for energy sector reform at a time when the stage may be set for historic change. Indeed, competent implementation of the agreement could demonstrate to Mexico that its interests can be protected in joint production regimes with U.S. companies and bring about an impetus for broader Mexican energy reforms. 6. Revive Energy Diplomacy and Commercial Engagement Energy diplomacy and commercial advocacy should be vital components of U.S. energy policy in the coming decades. The global energy system is projected to remain dependent upon fossil fuels for the foreseeable future, and as a result, having access to reliable, affordable sources of energy will remain important, as will the stability of energy markets. Energy diplomacy should center on ensuring that the U.S. has good working relationships with the countries that produce and consume energy. Successful energy diplomacy can serve a critical role in managing tensions over energy development, transportation, investment, and other issues. The Department of State has significantly increased its capabilities to conduct energy diplomacy through the establishment of the Energy and Natural Resources Bureau, led by Ambassador Carlos Pascual. Its programs should be robustly funded. We should also deepen the international energy diplomacy capacity of the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy’s relationships with civil servants in ministries across the globe provide a bridge across changes in government here and there. They can talk when the politics of non-energy issues obstruct dialogue among the foreign ministries. It is easier to get Energy Ministers together for regular meetings than Secretaries of State. Their staff should be expanded and serious program budget established to make our cooperation more than rhetorical. For true reform to be achieved, foreign ministers and heads of government will have to be involved, as this will be the key to integrating energy security into foreign policy. The three countries that need robust attention at this time are Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. Mexico is considering major reforms and we have much we can share at a technical level on gas markets, unconventional oil and gas technology, safe regulation of the deepwater, and energy efficiency. We should create a quiet bilateral mechanism for sharing this information with Mexican ministries, its nascent regulator and PEMEX. Changing global markets also impact Brazil, and we should ensure that the Strategic Energy Dialogue is reactivated as soon as new officials are on board at the Department of Energy. Venezuela is trickier because it is in political transition and there is a great deal of rhetorical hostility. But the US had a technical dialogue with Venezuela that lasted over 30 years. We need to know the new officials at the Ministry and PdVSA and to share our view of market realities, even if we may not agree on them. Sometime in 2013, after the Venezuelan elections, this technical dialogue should be revived, perhaps at the Assistant Secretary, or Deputy Assistant Secretary level. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, the ties between Latin America and the Caribbean and the energy security of the United States are numerous. Here I have addressed only a few of the possible avenues for improving U.S. energy security, and there are undoubtedly more, but the overarching conclusion is that energy security goals in the Hemisphere can be achieved through improved dialogue and relations with allies and adversaries alike. As I stated in 2008, it will require new approaches to energy and foreign policy. It will require fresh policy approaches, money, and creative diplomacy. But more than anything it will require leadership. As a citizen I thank the committee for its leadership on this critical issue.

**This will boost U.S. standing in important Latin American regional forums**

**Delahunt, 12** – chairman of the Venezuela-US Friendship Group and retired U.S. Representative Globe, 30 October 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/30/podium-venezuela/EJ6Jd2yRKfaJ76HYrXb4WJ/story.html)

The recent election in Venezuela offers an opportunity to improve the US-Venezuela bilateral relationship. On Oc. 7th, President Hugo Chavez was reelected to a new six-year term by a nine point margin. I — along with hundreds of other international witnesses — was duly impressed with the transparency of the electoral process and the enthusiasm of Venezuelans for democracy. Eighty-one percent percent of registered voters went to the polls! This turnout was remarkable when compared to the United States and other “mature” democracies. Whether or not one agrees with Chávez’s policies, there can be no doubt that he won these elections fairly. There are so many checks and balances in the electoral system in Venezuela that there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballot and the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the different political parties and independent observers. Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system “the best in the world.” He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at to verify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against the electronic tally. I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the voting centers, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. In contrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once the election authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidly conceded defeat, and he quickly scolded “radical” opposition supporters who insisted on alleging that fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chávez also behaved gracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together to mitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans. Most of Venezuela’s political leadership — following a tumultuous power struggle, during which a coup d’Etat and violent protests occurred — appear to have accepted to follow the democratic rulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than support one group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years. Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chávez. The United States should respect this outcome and seek to improve relations in areas where we can agree. Commercial relations between our two countries have generally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries would greatly benefit from their expansion. Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the region’s new multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States, which has increasingly found itself isolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these new groups greaton important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation. Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task. Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela, particularly in the area of international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelan government is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative.

**Latin American relations check all conflict. Only engagement solves.**

**Zedillo, et al., 8** – Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico (Ernesto, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, “Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World,” Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124\_latin\_america\_partnership.PDF)

The Need for a Hemispheric Partnership Historically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also, the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained underresourced. If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

**Failure to rebuild ties on oil issues allows China to solidify its stronghold and use oil as a diplomatic weapon against the U.S.**

**Hurst, 8** – political-military research analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office and a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy Reserve (Cindy, “China's Global Quest for Energy; Rocky U.S. Relationship with Venezuela is Playing into China's Energy Policy Despite The Ocean Between Them,” 8 September 2008, www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=740&pageid=&pagename=)

The U.S. rocky relationship with Venezuela is playing into China’s hands, perhaps better than Beijing expected. Venezuela exports approximately 60 percent of its oil to the U.S. However, since Hugo Chavez came into power in Venezuela in 1999, the U.S. and Venezuela have maintained a tense relationship, paving a path of continuous energy deals with China. Both China and Venezuela have been striking "International cooperation deals" that would not only not only provide increased oil exports to China, but also bolster Venezuela’s economy and oil infrastructure. In 2004, Chavez, who has visited China at least five times since 1999, signed such eight agreements on energy cooperation with the Asian country. According to China Daily, Venezuela currently ships nearly 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil and fuel to China. 80,000 of this is crude oil, which is up from 39,000 bpd the year before. In addition to various business arrangements between Venezuela’s state-run oil company and China Petroleum that include purchasing Venezuelan fuel oil and power plant fuel, Chinese companies are seeking to invest in oil exploration and production in the country. In return Chavez expects and is receiving Chinese assistance in the areas of telecommunications, food production and culture. The list of joint project is long, including not only oil sales from existing supply, but also the exploration and development of new fields and the development of older fields. In fact, Chavez visited China in December 2004, where he declared that Venezuela was ready to help China establish its own strategic petroleum reserve. He also spoke “of a budding strategic alliance between the two countries, and signed an agreement that would allow Chinese companies to gain developmental rights to 15 oil fields in eastern Venezuela. Although this would appear to be an excellent opportunity for China, there are still a number of hurdles to overcome before the full export potential can be realized. One issue facing China is transportation. China and Venezuela have a big ocean between them. While Chavez is opening the doors and allowing China access to Venezuela’s oil, transporting the oil is still costly. A tanker capable of hauling 500,000 barrels would be profitable on a short haul. However, that same size tanker will undoubtedly lose money hauling oil all the way to Asia. Currently, supertankers are not permitted to pass through the Panama Canal, which would save time and money by drastically cutting back the travel distance to transport the oil. In September 2007, the Panamanian government began a massive effort to widen the 93-year old canal. But the project is estimated to cost $5 billion and will take up to eight years to complete. The new canal will be able to accommodate maximum capacity ships. China will likely benefit most as it ranks second to the U.S. as the canal’s biggest user. But that will be years from now. Another alternative to delivering the oil to China is to build a pipeline from Venezuelan oil fields across Colombia to Pacific ports in Colombia or Ecuador. Unfortunately such a pipeline would currently be vulnerable to sabotage because it would run across a war zone where rebels have long made a habit of attacking the country’s existing pipelines. Additionally, the necessary Pacific port facilities currently do not exist and would have to be constructed. A third alternative would be an existing, refurbished inter-oceanic pipeline located in Panama. Large-scale oil shipments from Venezuela to China would dramatically increase the pipeline’s use. Additionally, the Venezuelan and Panamanian governments have been negotiating the use of the pipeline to pump the oil for quicker access to China. The pipeline reportedly has a capacity of 800,000 bpd. However, the pumps were installed to move oil from the Pacific to the Atlantic and would require modification or reversal to send the fuel the other direction. Chavez has also signed a contract to have China construct a number of supertankers, which will eliminate its dependency on renting these tankers. It will also, according to Chavez, allow him to create one of the greatest fleets in the world. Additionally, Venezuela plans to manufacture parts for the tankers, which will enable it to conduct much of its own maintenance. China’s interest in Venezuela’s oil poses a potential threat to U.S. interests. Venezuela is the U.S.’s fourth largest oil supplier after Canada, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. Tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela have been flaring since an April 2002 coup briefly removed Chavez from office. Chavez put the blame on the U.S., accusing Washington of sponsoring the attempted overthrow as well as a devastating oil lockout in 2002-2003. With a severe distrust of the Bush administration, and a marked “anti-imperialist viewpoint,” Chavez has voiced concerns that President Bush had plans to have him assassinated, adding that if he were killed the U.S. could “forget Venezuelan oil.” As the Venezuelan economy stands today, there is very little likelihood that Venezuela would stop exporting oil to the U.S. Venezuela depends too heavily on its oil industry. In one study it was estimated that over 60 percent of Venezuela’s population live in poverty, earning less than $2 per day. Using the revenues from Venezuela’s oil industry, Chavez has been able to offer a number of programs promoting literacy, job training, land reform, subsidized food and small loans. He has also used the revenue for health care and to import Cuban doctors. Once Venezuela secures an alternate export partner in China to replace the U.S., it could hurt the U.S., which depends on Venezuela to provide oil for 12 to 15 percent of its consumption rate. Despite statements made by Venezuelan officials, such as Ali Rodriguez, president of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, who called the assumption of replacing its U.S. business with China “absurd,” Chavez has made a number of threats, including that of putting an embargo on oil shipments to the U.S. The U.S. currently has the infrastructure in place, such as refineries capable of processing Venezuela’s crude. Refineries in China are not currently capable of processing Venezuela’s heavy crude oil. In May of this year, however, China and Venezuela agreed to build a refinery in China’s Guangdong province. The refinery will be capable of processing up to 400,000 bpd and will make Chavez’s goal of shipping one million bpd of oil to china by 2011 a reality. As China and Venezuela continue to work together, it will become easier for Chavez to use oil as a geopolitical weapon. China’s influence in certain countries could eventually backfire against the U.S. as certain major U.S. oil supplying nations find an oil export substitute in China. The Venezuelan government and its political disagreements and strong words with the Bush administration provides a perfect example of a country that could potentially cut off the U.S. in favor of doing business with China. Should China be able to carry the Venezuelan oil business with adequate purchases, oil could be used as a weapon of diplomacy against the U.S. Finally China, knowing that it could face a bleak future if its appetite is not curbed, is also searching for technology that will stretch its resources.

**Triggers great power conflict with China**

**Salameh, 11** – international oil economist, a consultant to the World Bank in Washington, DC on energy affairs and a technical expert of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization in Vienna (Mamdouh G., “China’s Oil ‘Adventure’ into Venezuela,” International Association for Energy Economics, Second Quarter 2011, www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=130)

China’s Global Oil Diplomacy China’s growing involvement in Venezuela is an integral part of its global oil diplomacy. China is very aware that its robust economic growth would falter without secure oil supplies. China’s global oil diplomacy is, therefore, geared towards ensuring that this never happens. The growing dependence on oil imports has created an increasing sense of ‘energy insecurity’ among Chinese leaders. The Chinese military argue that China’s energy security needs to be taken ‘seriously and dealt with strategically’16 That means less reliance on the Middle East, less transportation of oil via sea lanes policed by the U.S. Navy, more oil brought in by pipeline across Asia and by tanker across the Pacific and more capability for the Chinese navy to protect Chinese tankers. Henry Kissinger has warned of a potential great-power conflict over oil: this is it. For decades the doctrine of peaceful rise has meant that China has tried to secure energy and raw materials without confronting the United States and the West. China’s long-standing willingness to deal with states that the West regards pariahs is in part a recognition that dealing with Sudan, Angola, Iran or Uzbekistan allows China to avoid direct confrontation with Western interests. However, the larger China has become, the sheer scale of its energy needs has forced it more and more to intrude into areas that the United States regards as its own sphere of influence such as Venezuela. China’s penetration into the U.S. backyard could have profound political and economic implications for the U.S., as it is dependent for one-third of its oil on imports from South American oil suppliers that it can’t afford to lose to China. China’s global oil diplomacy could bring it into conflict with the United States unless both countries find a constructive accommodation that allows them to do business. Conclusions Under the cloak of Washington’s indifference, President Chavez is making steady progress in cementing strategic relations with China principally in the oil field. For Chavez, such a strategy enables him to achieve his political ambitions of eliminating U.S. political influence in his country and also reducing his country’s dependence on oil exports to the United States.

**U.S. assistance prevents exclusive Chinese influence**

**Fillingham, 13** –Managing Editor & Asia Analyst and MA in Chinese Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London (Zachary, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” 10 March 2013, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790)

Current polls indicate that Maduro would triumph in the coming election, a scenario that does not bode well for a thaw in US-Venezuelan relations. Maduro has dropped several indications that he plans to carry on his predecessor’s anti-American tone, notably by suggesting that the U.S. might be behind Chavez’s illness and by kicking out two U.S. military attaches under the accusation of “trying to destabilize Venezuelan politics.” But to take the inevitability of another United Socialist government as proof of a perpetual flatline in US-Venezuelan relations would be premature. It is a short-term consideration, and it’s only in the medium term that things will likely get interesting.First off, Maduro will have to grapple with the problem plaguing every political system that favors individual personality over rule of law. A vacuum has opened up at the very top of Venezuelan politics, and it remains to be seen whether Maduro has the charisma, and perhaps more importantly, the personal networks with which to fill it. The Chavez-era Venezuelan state was one that operated on a complex system of personal patronage that led all the way to the top; supporters were rewarded and detractors were marginalized. It remains to be seen whether this system will function smoothly with its head cut off. Political patronage goes hand in hand with Venezuela’s other pressing issue: an increasingly dysfunctional economy. Many Chavez-era policies could be described as political patronage on a mass scale, and while these policies did help Venezuela’s poor, they tended to be inefficient and short-sighted. For example, the Chavez government’s adult literacy program cost anywhere from $543 to $977 per adult learner. Compare that to Brazil’s program that uses pre-existing educational infrastructure to achieve a cost of $2.50 per learner. In Venezuela’s case, most of this money went into hiring adult literacy trainers, thus providing people with jobs- but only for as long as the government’s finances can hold out. And by all indications, Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out for very long. The country is currently running a deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil reserves and is a card-carrying member of OPEC, Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to a lack of foreign investment. The same is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic growth beyond the era of direct government handouts. Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, challenges that will preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a Maduro government will inevitably be faced with an economic reckoning of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads. Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politico-economic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism. But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations? Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, and countries like Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of opportunity presents itself.

**Aff is a prerequisite to other forms of engagement – now is the key time to use leverage to change internal Venezuelan policy**

**Roberts, 13** – master’s degree in international and development economics from Yale University and also holds a master of business administration from the University of Pittsburgh, Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth, Center for International Trade and Economics (CITE), and Sergio Daga, Visiting Senior Policy Analyst, Center for International Trade and Economics (CITE) (James, “Venezuela: U.S. Should Push President Maduro Toward Economic Freedom,” Issue Brief #3911, 4-15-13)

Hugo Chavez’s hand-picked successor, former trade union boss Nicolás Maduro, appears to have defeated Governor Henrique Capriles by a narrow margin in a contentious and hard-fought special election on April 14. Venezuela is in such shambles after 14 years of seat-of-the-pants mismanagement that Maduro—assuming his victory is confirmed—may ultimately be forced to pursue more moderate policies and seek help from the U.S. to restore stability. The Obama Administration and Congress should exploit this opening by using U.S. leverage to push Venezuela to turn from Chavez’s failed experiment in oil-cursed[1] “21st-century socialism” toward economic freedom. An Economy in Ruins The foundations of economic freedom in Venezuela have crumbled. When Chavez took office in 1999, Venezuela scored 54 out of 100 possible points in The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s annual Index of Economic Freedom. Today, however, after 14 years of Chavez’s soft authoritarian populism, Venezuela merits a score of just 36 points. This nearly 20-point plunge is among the most severe ever recorded by a country in the history of the Index. Its 2013 rank—174th out of 179 countries—places Venezuela among the most repressed nations in the world.[2] Venezuela’s dismal economic freedom score is reflected in statistics that translate into real-time hardship for Venezuelans, who must spend more of their incomes on higher prices for necessities—if they can find them on empty store shelves. There are scarcities of nearly all staple food and fuel products. In fact, according to the Banco Central of Venezuela’s (BCV) shortages index, Venezuela faces the most severe food shortages in four years.[3] And what food is available comes at a price: Mary O’Grady reports in The Wall Street Journal that “over the past 10 years inflation in food and nonalcoholic beverages is 1,284%.”[4] Financial disequilibrium in Venezuela is the result of a sharply widening fiscal deficit that reached almost 15 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) last year.[5] Government control of the formerly independent BCV also contributed to a massive expansion of the money supply. There are anecdotal reports in Caracas of people paying as much as 23 bolívars for one U.S. dollar in the black market as of early April. The official rate is just 6.3 bolívars per dollar—and that is after a significant 32 percent devaluation in February.[6] These problems were aggravated by Chavez’s foreign adventurism—which drained billions of petrodollars from the economy to keep afloat the failed economy in Fidel Castro’s Cuba—as well as generous subsidies to his Chavista cronies in the region through such schemes as ALBA and PetroCaribe. Corruption and Weak Rule of Law As reported in the Index, political interference in Venezuela’s judicial system has become routine, and corruption is rampant. The landscape in Caracas and elsewhere in the country is littered with half-finished, publicly funded infrastructure and housing projects. The government funds needed to complete them often disappear. As government expanded under Chavez, corruption became institutionalized. Chavez doubled the size of the public sector, many of whose 2.4 million[7] employees have no real job other than to work to keep the regime in power. A World Economic Forum (WEF) survey found little trust among businesses, politicians, the judicial system, and the police in Venezuela.[8] The tragic result is that Venezuela is now one of the most dangerous countries of the world. According to the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, in 2012 nearly 22,000 people were murdered.[9] An inefficient and non-transparent regulatory environment that is hostile to private foreign direct investment obstructs long-term development and hampers entrepreneurial growth. The investment regime is tightly controlled by the state and favors investors from China, Russia, Iran, and other democracy-challenged countries.[10] Investor protection in Venezuela is ranked at 140 out of 144 countries, according to the WEF report.[11] In 1998, before Chavez took power, there were more than 14,000 private industrial companies in Venezuela; in 2011, after 13 years of extensive nationalizations and expropriations, only about 9,000 remained.[12] The Chavez government did make one product very inexpensive for Venezuelans: Generous energy subsidies mean a car can be filled up with 15 gallons of gasoline for less than one U.S. dollar.[13] Although that might buy short-term political advantage for the Chavista government, in the long term these energy subsidies are very destructive to future economic growth, since Venezuelan companies have a distorted cost base and thus cannot compete globally. Operations of the state oil company, PDVSA, have also deteriorated significantly under Chavez. When he took office, PDVSA was producing 3.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d); today, it is down to 2.5 bbl/d.[14] Social Programs and Inequality Ironically, Chavez’s years in power did not result in much reduction of poverty and inequality. Although some measures of income inequality (such as the Gini coefficient) did improve under Chavez,[15] according to a recently published research paper by Darryl McLeod and Nora Lustig[16] that used data for 18 Latin American countries, market democracies such as Chile and Brazil were far more successful at reducing inequality and poverty than the populist Chavista regimes. Despite its vast oil wealth, Venezuela’s economic growth performance has also been poor. Between 1999 and 2012, average annual per capita growth was just 1.1 percent, while in the top four Latin American countries (Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Chile) the rate was 3.6 percent.[17] Not surprisingly, the rate of private investment in Venezuela—under 5 percent—is also one of the lowest in the region. In Peru and Chile, it is almost 20 percent.[18] U.S. Policy Toward the New Maduro Government Washington should insist on strict conditionality before sending a new U.S. ambassador to Caracas or assenting to any new lending to Venezuela by international financial institutions until the new government: Produces a comprehensive plan for reform that reduces the size of the public sector, reverses nationalizations and expropriations of land and enterprises with just compensation to owners, restores the independence of the central bank and judicial institutions, reforms the electoral system, and submits to an internationally supervised audit of the government’s books during the Chavez years; Takes steps to privatize PDVSA to bring in international equity partners with the expertise and financial capacity to restore PDVSA to the high level of professional operational and managerial expertise for which it was widely respected prior to 1999; Immediately stops all subsidies to Cuba and terminates wasteful and economically destabilizing subsidy programs such as PetroCaribe and ALBA; Ceases cooperation with international state sponsors of terrorism (such as Iran) and joins the international community’s cooperative efforts in the fight against transnational crime, narco-trafficking, and terrorism; and Restores freedom of the press and access to information for all Venezuelans. Use U.S. Leverage The foundations of economic freedom in Venezuela were severely weakened during the 14-year misrule by Chavez. Although Chavez’s death may aggravate instability and further polarize Venezuela, it need not be that way. Venezuela is in need of immediate and sweeping reforms, but these changes will take time, effort, determination, and, above all, dedicated reformers in Venezuela. The Obama Administration should step into the breach with active and forward-looking policies to bring Venezuela back into the globalized economic system.

## 2AC

**Roleplaying**

**Policy is a tool to resolve our impacts, not paralyze action**

**Shove & Walker, 7** - \*Sociology @ Lancaster, \*\*Geography @ Lancaster

Elizabeth “CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” Environment and Planning C 39 (4)

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘illusion **of agency’**, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘**illusions are productive** because they **motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the **dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are **necessary to processes within**. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

**Debate roleplay specifically activates agency**

**Hanghoj, 8** – assistant professor at Aarhus University, since this PhD project began in 2004, has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials) (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Thus, **debate games** require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s **dialogical** philosophy also offers an explanation of why **debate games** (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and **imagined scenario** both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the **outsider’s perspective** reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and f**ind their own voice.** Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as **“ideological becoming”**, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing **debate scenarios,** it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

**Epistemology**

**Broad indicts of epistemology don’t take out our impacts – weigh specific evidence to get closer to the truth**

**Kratochwil, 8** professor of international relations – European University Institute, (Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213, 2008)

In what follows, I claim that the shift in focus from “demonstration” to science as practice provides strong prima facie reasons to choose pragmatic rather than traditional epistemological criteria in social analysis. Irrespective of its various forms, the epistemological project includes an argument that all warranted knowledge has to satisfy certain field- independent criteria that are specified by philosophy (a “theory of know- ledge”). The real issue of how our concepts and the world relate to each other, and on which non-idiosyncratic grounds we are justified to hold on to our beliefs about the world, is “answered” by two metaphors. The first is that of an inconvertible ground, be it the nature of things, certain intuitions (Des- cartes’ “clear and distinct ideas”) or methods and inferences; the second is that of a “mirror” that shows what is the case. There is no need to rehearse the arguments demonstrating that these under- lying beliefs and metaphors could not sustain the weight placed upon them. A “method” à la Descartes could not make good on its claims, as it depended ultimately on the guarantee of God that concepts and things in the outer world match. On the other hand, the empiricist belief in direct observation forgot that “facts” which become “data” are – as the term suggests – “made”. They are based on the judgements of the observer using cultural criteria, even if they appear to be based on direct perception, as is the case with colours.4 Besides, there had always been a sneaking suspicion that the epistemo- logical ideal of certainty and rigour did not quite fit the social world, an objection voiced first by humanists such as Vico, and later rehearsed in the continuing controversies about erklären and verstehen (Weber 1991; for a more recent treatment see Hollis 1994). In short, both the constitutive nature of our concepts, and the value interest in which they are embedded, raise peculiar issues of meaning and contestation that are quite different from those of description. As Vico (1947) suggested, we “understand” the social world because we have “made it”, a point raised again by Searle concerning both the crucial role played by ascriptions of meaning (x counts for y) in the social world and the distinction between institutional “facts” from “brute” or natural facts (Searle 1995). Similarly, since values are constitutive for our “interests”, the concepts we use always portray an action from a certain point of view; this involves appraisals and prevents us from accepting allegedly “neutral” descriptions that would be meaningless. Thus, when we say that someone “abandoned” another person and hence communicate a (contestable) appraisal, we want to call attention to certain important moral implica- tions of an act. Attempting to eliminate the value-tinge in the description and insisting that everything has to be cast in neutral, “objective”, observational language – such as “he opened the door and went through it” – would indeed make the statement “pointless”, even if it is (trivially) “true” (for a powerful statement of this point, see Connolly 1983). The most devastating attack on the epistemological project, however, came from the history of science itself. It not only corrected the naive view of knowledge generation as mere accumulation of data, but it also cast increasing doubt on the viability of various field-independent “demarcation criteria”. This was, for the most part, derived from the old Humean argument that only sentences with empirical content were “meaningful”, while value statements had to be taken either as statements about individual preferences or as meaningless, since de gustibus non est disputandum. As the later dis- cussion in the Vienna circle showed, this distinction was utterly unhelpful (Popper 1965: ch. 2). It did not solve the problem of induction, and failed to acknowledge that not all meaningful theoretical sentences must correspond with natural facts. Karl Popper’s ingenious solution of making “refutability” the logical cri- terion and interpreting empirical “tests” as a special mode of deduction (rather than as a way of increasing supporting evidence) seemed to respond to this epistemological quandary for a while. An “historical reconstruction” of science as a progressive development thus seemed possible, as did the specification of a pragmatic criterion for conducting research. Yet again, studies in the history of science undermined both hopes. The different stages in Popper’s own intellectual development are, in fact, rather telling. He started out with a version of conjectures and refutations that was based on the notion of a more or less self-correcting demonstration. Con- fronted with the findings that scientists did not use the refutation criterion in their research, he emphasised then the role of the scientific community on which the task of “refutation” devolved. Since the individual scientist might not be ready to bite the bullet and admit that she or he might have been wrong, colleagues had to keep him or her honest. Finally, towards the end of his life, Popper began to rely less and less on the stock of knowledge or on the scientists’ shared theoretical understandings – simply devalued as the “myth of the framework” – and emphasised instead the processes of communica- tion and of “translation” among different schools of thought within a scien- tific community (Popper 1994). He still argued that these processes follow the pattern of “conjecture and refutation”, but the model was clearly no longer that of logic or of scientific demonstration, but one that he derived from his social theory – from his advocacy of an “open society” (Popper 1966). Thus a near total reversal of the ideal of knowledge had occurred. While formerly everything was measured in terms of the epistemological ideal derived from logic and physics, “knowledge” was now the result of deliberation and of certain procedural notions for assessing competing knowledge claims. Politics and law, rather than physics, now provided the template. Thus the history of science has gradually moved away from the epistemo- logical ideal to focus increasingly on the actual practices of various scientific communities engaged in knowledge production, particularly on how they handle problems of scientific disagreement.5 This reorientation implied a move away from field-independent criteria and from the demonstrative ideal to one in which “**arguments” and the “weight” of evidence had to be appraised**. This, in turn, not only generated a bourgeoning field of “science studies” and their “social” epistemologies (see Fuller 1991), but also suggested more generally that the traditional understandings of knowledge production based on the model of “theory” were in need of revision. If the history of **science** therefore **provides strong reasons for a pragmatic turn**, as the discussion above illustrates, what remains to be shown is how this turn relates to the historical, linguistic and constructivist turns that preceded it. To start with, from the above it should be clear that, in the social world, we are not dealing with natural kinds that exist and are awaiting, so to speak, prepackaged, their placement in the appropriate box. The objects we investi- gate are rather conceptual creations and they are intrinsically linked to the language through which the social world is constituted. Here “constructivists”, particularly those influenced by Wittgenstein and language philosophy, easily link up with “pragmatists” such as Rorty, who emphasises the product- ive and pragmatic role of “vocabularies” rather than conceiving of language as a “mirror of nature” (Rorty 1979). Furthermore, precisely because social facts are not natural, but have to be reproduced through the actions of agents, any attempt to treat them like “brute” facts becomes doubly problematic. For one, even “natural” facts are not simply “there”; they are interpretations based on our theories. Secondly, different from the observation of natural facts, in which perceptions address a “thing” through a conceptually mediated form, social reality is entirely “arti- ficial” in the sense that it is dependent on the beliefs and practices of the actors themselves. This reproductive process, directed by norms, always engenders change either interstitially, when change is small-scale or adaptive – or more dramatically, when it becomes “transformative” – for instance when it produces a new system configuration, as after the advent of national- ism (Lapid and Kratochwil 1995) or after the demise of the Soviet Union (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994). Consequently, any examination of the social world has to become in a way “historical” even if some “structuralist” theories attempt to minimise this dimension. [. . .] **Therefore a pragmatic approach to social science and IR seems both necessary and promising**. On the one hand, it is substantiated by the failure of the epistemological project that has long dominated the field. On the other, it offers a **different positive heuristics** that challenges IR’s traditional disciplin- ary boundaries and methodological assumptions. Interest in pragmatism therefore does not seem to be just a passing fad – even if such an interpre- tation cannot entirely be discounted, given the incentives of academia to find, just like advertising agencies, “new and improved” versions of familiar products.

**Epistemology fails**

**Wendt, 98** professor of international security – Ohio State University,(Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association, 1998)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The **central point** of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will **inevitably lead to confusion** (after all, **after 2000 years, even** the **specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. **Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance**, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, **not second-order issues of method.** Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contamin- ated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘**paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is **not clear by what criteria their work should be judged**, **or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures** of science.

**2AC – Imperialism**

**Extinction comes first**

**Bok, 88** (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

**Empirics first – discourse focus is epistemologically flawed and paralyzes action**

**Rodwell 5** (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm slim\_)

The reason it there is no attempt to explore the complexity of causation is that this would clearly automatically undermine the concentration on discourse. Moreover it would require the admittance of identifiable evidence about the real world to be able to say anything about it! For if something historical changed the meaning of a word, or if something about society gave the word a different meaning and impact, then it would be an identifiable ‘something’. Moreover if the word is tied to and altered by an historical event or social impact, would it not be a case of assessing the effect of original event itself as well as the language? The larger problem is that without clear causal links between materially identifiable events and factors any assessment within the argument actually becomes nonsensical. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is how do we know this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much – Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that King’s argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I don’t personally believe global terrorism is the world’s primary threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But without the ability to identify real facts about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearly ridiculous and many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there “are empirically more persuasive explanations.”[xi] The phrase ‘empirically persuasive’ is however the final undermining of post-structural discourse analysis. It is a seemingly fairly obvious reintroduction of traditional methodology and causal links. It implies things that can be seen to be right regardless of perspective or discourse. It again goes without saying that logically in this case if such an assessment is possible then undeniable material factors about the word are real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition. Language or culture then does not wholy constitute reality. How do we know in the end that the world not threatened by the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast cereal? Because empirically persuasive evidence tells us this is the case. The question must then be asked, is our understanding of the world born of evidential assessment, or born of discourse analysis? Or perhaps it’s actually born of utilisation of many different possible explanations.

**Their understanding is simplistic – US lead political order prevents war – interdependence, institution-building, and democracy promotion**

**Ikenberry 4** (G. John Ikenberry, Prof. of Geopolitics, “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004)

Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's military empire. But ultimately, the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term. The advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent. To be sure, the neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately, the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States. And as Ferguson notes, the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of great-power war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.

**The alternative is Chinese imperialism**

**Horner and Leiken 6** (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim\_)

And the corollary to this, I suppose, is that the only non-white people in the world who really matter, say, in running the international economy are either Japanese or Chinese. Or maybe they’re Korean, but let’s just say for the sake of this argument the Chinese now. It used to be the Japanese had a certain purchase in their model. So the Chinese have a certain thing going for themselves. They’re not European, they’re not American, they’re not white. They have another advantage in the fact that they call their system socialism and that they call their ruling party communist. And this, as Jaime suggests, with respect to their actual conduct, you see, allows them to say or allows them to claim, allows them to think that what they do – that their economic expansion in the world is somehow different in kind from the Western economic expansion of the 19th and 20th century, and that China’s multinational banks and corporations, who are very active in Latin America is something different, and so on, even as, analytically speaking, Hobson or Lenin would recognize China as a kind of **economic imperialist** power. It imports primary products; it’s a creditor; it exports finished goods; it exploits its own and other countries’ cheap labor, is what it does do; it invests in and wants to control critical infrastructure like ports, airports, highways, telecommunications; and it uses its political influence – that is to say corrupts local political systems to protect its economic interests. But there may – for all of this now, I think we’re already beginning to see the signs of the certain self-limiting aspect of it. As Chair Mao himself once wrote, you see, “Wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance.” And we can’t be surprised therefore that there are resentments already building in Brazil about the terms of trade, or in Mexico about the fact that China is a competitor for the American market. And countries which export primary products are not happy to see the Chinese drifting vaguely into the group of importers, trying to use their own strong position in the market – I think the technical term for this is monopsonist – position to somehow bargain with exporters for price constraints. And therefore it does seem that the countries are on the receiving end of this sort of thing, wherever they are, tend to seek balance. In this case the so-called stronger parties are China and the United States, and presumably it is in the space between them that one finds ones own opportunities as countries in this situation always have ever since 1945.

**That kills democracy and leads to protectionism and arms races**

**Horner and Leiken 6** (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim\_)

But in any case, so Latin America welcomes the chance to kind of reduce its dependence on us. But there are several rather negative impacts or even potential impacts of China’s involvement in Latin America for Latin America. First of all, right now, although Latin America has benefited tremendously by China’s huge imports from the region, 2006 may turn out to be the first year where the terms of trade switch because China’s exports, manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing very, very rapidly. I thought I had the numbers here but I don’t. But anyway, this year may be the year where Latin America sells more to Latin America than it imports. This clearly is changing. Argentina is a key example where the imports of Chinese goods into Argentina have been growing very, very rapidly compared to the exports to China. The other way in which the involvement in China will work against Latin America, and maybe already has, is that China managed – when it was promising all these great trade benefits and agreements – managed to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it a – to label it a – give it market economy status, which meant that anti-dumping legislation under the WTO rules would be – the impact of them would be substantially diminished. They couldn’t bring – Latin American countries couldn’t bring those kinds of charges. So as a result, this gave China much more access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods. Even the United States and Europe didn’t give China the market economy status, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile did. And I think Ecuador recently joined in. So this is going to hurt Latin America because it’s going to tip the scales much more in favor of China, which doesn’t exactly abide by all the free trade kinds of rules. It’s **highly protectionist**; also, it steals a lot of intellectual property and the like. The other problem with the relationship is that because of the commodities boom, et cetera, Latin America – the chances of Latin America enacting the kinds of economic reforms that are necessary in order to make the Latin American economies more globally competitive are now **reduced**, with the exception of Chile – everything is always with the exception of Chile. But with the exception of Chile, which is setting aside some of the revenues from the commodities boom for times when the commodities boom is not with us, most of Latin America is just spending the money, taking it in but not thinking ahead, not planning, not using it to make Latin America more economically competitive globally. So these are chickens hat are going to come home to roost. The other negative for Latin America is that obviously **Chinese relationships** with countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, et cetera, works to **undermine democracy** in the region and strengthens countries that are not exactly pro-democratic or anti-military or whatever. And, of course, I’m someone who grew up – went to graduate school during the days of dependency theory, where the Latin American scholars were claiming that – coming from the left – that the relationship with U.S. and multinational corporations, et cetera, was bad for Latin America. The terms of trade were bad; that Latin America was being reinforced as a producer of commodities, whereas the United States was selling manufacturers to Latin America. Well, guess what? I mean, that’s China and Latin America now. I mean, you could make the argument that the economic relationship with China is reinforcing Latin America’s traditional role as a commodities producer, and is favoring Chinese efforts to sell manufacturers, which supposedly have, in general, better terms of trade. Finally the issue of, is it good or bad for the United States, China’s relationship with Latin America? I mean, some of this is already obvious, that it helps the United States’ interests in the region to the extent that China helps Latin America grow and stabilize. China is not interested in having a chaotic, unstable Latin America for reasons of its own, and that of course is good for the United States, too. But on the other hand, if you look at the pillars – I mean, a lot of people say that the United States has no policy toward Latin America so there is no way we can even identify what the pillars of the policy are, but I do think we do have a policy toward Latin America. Whether or not it’s the right one or whether or not we’re doing enough is another issue. But support for **democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is not supportive of that**. Support for market economies – China is in a sense kind of neutral. Some of them are being supported; some of them are not. **Arms race** – it’s helping in terms of supporting countries like Venezuela, et cetera. In terms of support for the Latin American left – we don’t care about the Latin American left in general as long as they’re democratic. Well, the Chinese behavior is also consolidating the – or helping to consolidate the not-good Latin American left.

**Democracy prevents extinction**

**Diamond, 95** - Hoover Institute Senior Fellow (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The **very source of life on Earth**, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. **Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy**, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

**Alt destroys hegemony or it doesn’t solve – heg is good – deters and deescalates conflict – decline causes transition wars**

Brooks et al 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51,http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00107, GDI File]

 A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimismregarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to **obtain a nuclear capacity** and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a **destabilizing reaction from China**. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however,undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and theyengage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts thatthe withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war).

**The aff reveals the perspective of the oppressed, and in so doing shares their secrets—this undermines the potential for resistance, turning the case**

**Hundleby 5** (Catherine, U of Windsor, The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets, Hypatia, 20(4), Fall 2005, p. 44-58)//LA

I keep secrets. Even though I am told over and over by white feminists that we must reveal ourselves, open ourselves, I keep secrets. Disclosing our secrets threatens our survival. —María Lugones Postcolonial and other oppositional literature introduces many readers to secrets from the social margins, sometimes only mentioning them, sometimes sharing their content. Moving beyond colonialism and other forms of oppres- sion is as much a goal as a description of this writing. Because survival may be threatened, the question arises in what circumstances feminists should expect the secrets of oppressed people to be shared, and so in what circumstances we should investigate or reveal them. This issue seems to confound the central claim of standpoint epistemologists—postcolonial, feminist, or otherwise—that there is cognitive value in learning from people’s experiences of oppression (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1986; Mills 1998). Whether or not one shares similar experiences, standpoint theorists argue, to begin thought from the perspective of “others” and “other ‘others,’” as Sandra Harding puts it, provides an epistemic advantage. Secrets concerned with resistance, such as in the Underground Railroad, women’s shelters, and lesbian passing, must be especially valuable and relevant to developing knowledge from a standpoint, because activism is supposed to be necessary to acquire the advantage. Yet, revealing aspects of resistance so vulnerable that they are kept secret threatens to undermine the potential of those secrets for resisting and opposing oppression. Thus, the epistemological value of oppositional secrecy seems to conflict with standpoint theorists’ advice of emancipatory activism. The case of oppositional secrecy seems to indicate an exception to standpoint theory, a case in which emancipatory politics does not encourage but prohibits sharing understanding. However, as I argue in this essay, the need to preserve oppositional secrecy is not an exception to, but only a limited case of, standpoint epistemology. Political considerations do not bar some of the understandings that might be gained, but political distinctions do indicate when and where the cognitive value of such understandings tapers off. The cognitive signifi- cance of exposing hidden understanding reduces in cases of extreme political vulnerability that morally require secrecy.

**Neolib**

**Violence decreasing in the status quo – neo-lib decreases incentive for war**

**Gat, 13** (AZAR GAT, DPhil in History (University of Oxford, 1986); Ezer Weitzman Professor of National Security, Political Science Department, Tel Aviv University; recent books: War in Human Civilization (Oxford University Press, 2006); Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It Is Still Imperiled (Hoover Institution, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Is war declining – and why? Azar Gat Department of Political Science, University of Tel Aviv azargat@post.tau.ac.il , March 19th 2013)

When quite **a number of scholars** **simultaneously and independently** of one another arrive at very similar conclusions on an **issue of cardinal theoretical and practical significance**, their thesis deserves, and has received, great attention. The thesis is that **war and violence** in general have progressively **decreased in recent times, during the modern era, and** even throughout history. Of course, despite their unanimity, all these scholars could still be wrong. Indeed, each of them tells a similar story of people’s disbelief at their findings, most notably that **we live in the most peaceful period in** human **history**. Some of them even explain the general incredulity by the findings of evolutionary psychology according to which we tend to be overly optimistic about ourselves but overly pessimistic about the world at large. Having myself written about the marked decrease in deadly human violence (Gat, 2006), I agree with the authors’ general thesis. However, their unanimity falters over, and they are less clear about, the historical trajectory of and the reasons for the decline in violence and war, questions that are as important as the general thesis itself. Previous Section Next Section Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) towers above all the other books surveyed here in size, scope, boldness, and scholarly excellence. It has deservedly attracted great public attention and has become a best-seller. Massively documented, this 800-page volume is lavishly furnished with statistics, charts, and diagrams, which are one of the book’s most effective features. The book, spanning the whole human past as far back as our aboriginal condition, points to two major steps in the decline of violence. The first is the sharp decline in violent mortality which resulted from the rise of the state-Leviathan from around 5,000 years ago. This conclusion is based on the most comprehensive studies of the subject published over the past 15 years (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003; Gat, 2006), which demonstrate on the basis of anthropological and archaeological evidence that Hobbes’s picture of the anarchic state of nature as a very violent one was fundamentally true. Pinker rightly summarizes that violent mortality with the rise of states dropped from a staggering estimated 15% of the population, 25% of the men, in pre-state societies, to about 1–5%. The main reason for this drop is the enforcement of internal peace by the Leviathan, but also, less noted by Pinker, lower mobilization rates and a smaller exposure of the civilian population to war than with tribal groups, as will be explained shortly. This conclusion regarding the dramatic drop in violent mortality with the transition to the state is at odds with the claim made by Jack Levy & William Thompson in their book, The Arc of War (2011). As the book’s title implies, Levy & Thompson posit a great increase in warfare during history, before a decrease during the past two centuries. Thus, the book claims that mortality in fighting greatly increased, ‘accelerated’ in the authors’ language, with the transition to the state. They reach this conclusion by making several mistaken assumptions. First, although professing ignorance about the distant past because of the lack of evidence on the behavior of hunter-gatherer societies before the adoption of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, they cite and are heavily influenced by the old Rousseauite anthropology of the generation after the 1960s, which recent studies have refuted. Obviously, one does not have to accept the above findings regarding the pervasiveness and great lethality of prehistoric warfare. But Levy & Thompson simply do not engage with them. They accept as true the Rousseauite premise that sparse human population could not possibly have had that much to fight about. However, recently extant hunter-gatherer societies prove the opposite. Australia is our best laboratory of hunter-gatherer societies, because that vast continent was entirely populated by them and ‘unpolluted’ by agriculturalists, pastoralists or states until the arrival of the Europeans in 1788. And the evidence shows that the Australian tribes fought incessantly with one another. Even in the Central Australian Desert, whose population density was as low as one person per 35 square miles, among the lowest there is, conflict and deadly fighting were the rule. Much of that fighting centered on the water-holes vital for survival in this area, with the violent death rate there reckoned to have been several times higher than in any state society. In most other places, hunting territories were monopolized and fiercely defended by hunter-gatherers because they were quickly depleted. Even among the Inuit of Arctic Canada, who were so sparse as to experience no resource competition, fighting to kidnap women was pervasive, resulting in a violent death rate 10 times higher than the USA’s peak rate of 1990, itself the highest in the developed world. In more hospitable and densely populated environments casualties averaged, as already mentioned, 15% of the population and 25% of the men, and the surviving men were covered with scars (Gat, 2006: chs 2, 6). We are not dealing here with a piece of exotic curiosity. Ninety-five percent of the history of our species Homo sapiens sapiens – people who are like us – was spent as hunter-gatherers. The transition to agriculture and the state is very recent, the tip of the iceberg, in human history. Furthermore, the human state of nature turns out to be no different than the state of nature in general. Here too, science has made a complete turnabout. During the 1960s people believed that animals did not kill each other within the same species, which made humans appear like a murderous exception and fed speculations that warfare emerged only with civilization. Since then, however, it has been found that animals kill each other extensively within species, a point pressed on every viewer of television nature documentaries. There is nothing special about humans in this regard. Thus, lethal human fighting did not ‘emerge’ at some point in history, as Levy & Thompson posit. Previous Section Next Section Violent death sharply decreased with the rise of the Leviathan As mentioned earlier and as Pinker well realizes, violent mortality actually dropped steeply with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Here is where Levy & Thompson make a second mistake. For measuring the lethality of warfare they use evidence of battle mortality, but this is highly misleading for various reasons. First, pre-state tribes’ main fighting modes were not the battle but the raid and the ambush – capturing the enemy by surprise and often annihilating entire sleeping camps: men, women, and children. Second, the size of battles merely indicates the size of the states and their armies, which are obviously larger than tribal groups in absolute terms. Yet the main question is relative casualties, what percentage of the population died violently. And here the fact is that while states and their armies grew by a factor of tens, hundreds, and thousands, giving a spectacular impression of large-scale fighting, relative casualties actually decreased under the state, and not only because of internal peace. Indeed, casualties decreased precisely because states grew large. Take Egypt, for example, part of the ‘acceleration’ of war with the emergence of states in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and China, according to Levy & Thompson. The size of the Egyptian army with which Pharaoh Ramses II fought the Hittite empire at the Battle of Kadesh (commonly dated 1274 BCE) was 20,000–25,000 soldiers. This was a very large army by the standards of the time. Yet the total population of Egypt was about 2–3 million, so the army constituted 1% of the population at most. This was very much the standard in large states and empires throughout history because of the great financial and logistical problems of maintaining large armies for long periods at great distances from home. Thus, in comparison to the high military participation rates of small-scale tribal societies, participation rates, and hence war casualties, in large states’ armies were much lower. Moreover, in contrast to the great vulnerability of women and children in small-scale tribal warfare, the civilian population of Egypt was sheltered by distance from the theaters of military operations and not often exposed to the horrors of war. Such relative security, interrupted only by large-scale invasions, is one of the main reasons why societies experienced great demographic growth after the emergence of the state. It is also the reason why civil war, when the war rages within the country, tends to be the most lethal form of war, as Hobbes very well realized. Warfare and feuds in the pre- and early-modern eras Levy & Thompson further posit that between the 14th and early 19th centuries, Europe was the scene of a second ‘acceleration’ in the historical trajectory of violence. This is very much in line with the prevailing perceptions regarding early modern European history, but these perceptions are most probably wrong, and for the same reason as before: Levy & Thompson count absolute battle casualties, and obviously states became more centralized during this period and armies grew in number, so battles also grew in size. Yet it was the anarchy and feudal fragmentation in Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and 1200 that were responsible for the pervasive insecurity and endemic violence that characterized the Dark Ages and resulted in, among other things, a sharp demographic decline. Again, small-scale usually meant more, not less, violent mortality. The focus on early modern Europe is misleading also in another way: in the late Middle Ages the Mongol conquests inflicted on the societies of China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe casualties and destruction that were among the highest ever suffered during historical times. Estimates of the sharp decline experienced by the populations of China and Russia, for example, vary widely. Still, even by the lowest estimates they were at least as great, and in China almost definitely much greater, than the Soviet Union’s horrific rate in World War II of about 15%. The receding of medieval anarchy in the face of the growing European state-Leviathans was the first step towards a steep decline in the continent’s violent mortality rate beginning in early modernity and continuing to the present day. The studies and data cited by Pinker with respect to the domestic aspect of this trend are strikingly paralleled by those of Robert Muchembled’s History of Violence (2012). The work of a historian, the book meticulously documents, on the basis of French legal records, a 20-fold decrease in homicide rates between the 13th and 20th centuries. Earlier studies of other parts of Europe, starting with Gurr (1981), have come up with similar findings. Like Pinker, Muchembled attributes the steep decline to the state’s growing authority, as its justice system effectively replaced and deterred ‘private justice’, vendetta, and pervasive violence, all of them endemic in unruly societies. Correspondingly, again like Pinker, Muchembled invokes Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilizing process’, whereby the defense of honor by sword and knife, a social norm and imperative in most traditional societies, is gradually given up among both the nobility and the general populace. The civilizing process is partly a function of the growing authority of the state’s rule and justice system. But there were other factors involved, which Pinker excels in identifying and weaving together. Although he is not a historian, his historical synthesis is exemplarily rich and nuanced. He specifies the growing humanitarian sensibilities in Europe of the Enlightenment, which he traces to, among other things, the gradual improvement in living conditions, growing commercial spirit and, above all, the print revolution with the attendant values and habits of reasoning, introspection, and empathy that it inculcated among the reading elites. As Pinker points out, not only did homicide rates decline but also other previously common forms of violence, such as judicial disembowelment and torture, were becoming unacceptable by the 18th century. This was the beginning of a continuous process which during the following centuries would bring about, among other things, the abolition of slavery and the decline of capital punishment, tyranny, and political violence in the developed world – most notably in the areas where the values of Enlightenment humanitarianism triumphed. Both Pinker and Muchembled identify a change in the trend towards increased violence and homicide rates in the United States and Europe from the 1960s on. They attribute this change (Pinker is particularly elaborative here) to the erosion of public authority and some reversal of the ‘civilizing process’ with the cults of youth culture, defiance of authority, radical ideologies of violence by the ‘oppressed’, and the fragmentation of the stable family structure. Pinker identifies a return to a downward trend in violence from about 1990 on, which he attributes to an ebbing of much of the above through reasserted state action and changes in the public mood. A last point worth mentioning in this context: Muchembled reveals that throughout the steep decline in homicide rates, from medieval times to the present, 90% or more of all cases have been perpetrated by men, especially between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. As Daly & Wilson (1988: 145–149) have shown, this ratio is found in each and every society studied around the globe, from hunter-gatherers to agricultural and industrial societies, irrespective of the vastly different homicide rates among them. Previous Section Next Section The decline of war and the three `Long Peaces' after 1815 We now move to the decline of war, which is our main concern here. Most people are surprised to learn that the occurrence of war and overall mortality in war sharply decreased after 1815, most notably in the developed world. The ‘Long Peace’ among the great powers after 1945 is more recognized and is widely attributed to the nuclear factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which concentrated the minds of all the protagonists wonderfully. The (inter-)democratic peace has been equally recognized. But in actuality, the decrease in war had been very marked before the nuclear era and encompassed both democracies and non-democracies. In the century after 1815, wars among economically advanced countries declined in their frequency to about one-third of what they had been in the previous centuries, an unprecedented change. Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945 was preceded by the second longest peace among the great powers, between 1871 and 1914, and by the third longest peace, between 1815 and 1854 (Gat, 2006: 536–537, 608). Thus, the three longest periods of peace by far in the modern great powers system all occurred after 1815. Clearly, one needs to explain the entire trend, while also accounting for the glaring divergence from it: the two World Wars. Previous Section Next Section Is modern war more lethal and destructive than before? In his earlier works, Levy (1983) was among the first to document the much-reduced frequency of war after 1815. But what brought about this change? Levy & Thompson assume – this is perhaps the most natural hypothesis – that wars declined in frequency because they became too lethal, destructive, and expensive. Supposedly, a trade-off of sorts was created between the intensity and frequency of warfare: fewer, larger wars supplanting many smaller ones. This hypothesis barely holds, however, because, again, relative to population and wealth wars have not become more lethal and costly than earlier in history. Furthermore, as Levy & Thompson rightly document, the wars of the 19th century – the most peaceful century in European history – were particularly light, in comparative terms, so there is no trade-off here. True, the World Wars, especially World War II, were certainly on the upper scale of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, as already noted, they were far from being exceptional in history. Once more, we need to look at relative casualties, general human mortality in any number of wars that happen to rage around the world, rather than at the aggregate created by the fact that many states participated in the World Wars. I have already mentioned the Mongol invasions, but other examples abound. In the first three years of the Second Punic War, 218–16 BCE, Rome lost some 50,000 citizens of the ages of 17–46, out of a total of about 200,000 in that age demographic (Brunt, 1971). This was roughly 25% of the military-age cohorts in only three years, the same range as the Russian and higher than the German rates in World War II. This, and the devastation of Rome’s free peasantry during the Second Punic War, did not reduce Rome’s propensity for war thereafter. During the Thirty Years War (1618–48) population loss in Germany is estimated at between one-fifth and one-third – either way higher than the German casualties in World War I and World War II combined. People often assume that more developed military technology during modernity means greater lethality and destruction, but in fact it also means greater protective power, as with mechanized armor, mechanized speed and agility, and defensive electronic measures. Offensive and defensive advances generally rise in tandem. In addition, it is all too often forgotten that the vast majority of the many millions of non-combatants killed by Germany during World War II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet civilians – fell victim to intentional starvation, exposure to the elements, and mass executions rather than to any sophisticated military technology. Instances of genocide in general during the 20th century, much as earlier in history, were carried out with the simplest of technologies, as the Rwanda genocide horrifically reminded us. Nor have wars during the past two centuries been economically more costly than they were earlier in history, again relative to overall wealth. War has always involved massive economic exertion and has been the single most expensive item of state spending (e.g. massively documented, Bonney, 1999). Examples are countless, and it will suffice to mention that both 16th- and 17th-century Spain and 18th-century France were economically ruined by war and staggering war debts, which in the French case brought about the Revolution. Furthermore, death by starvation in premodern wars was widespread. Previous Section Next Section Is it peace that has become more profitable? So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant. Thus, the greater the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.

**Market capitalism is inevitable – crisis empirically promotes capitalist growth**

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A specter is haunting the world—the return of capitalism. Over the past six months, politicians, businessmen and pundits have been convinced that we are in the midst of a crisis of capitalism that will require a massive transformation and years of pain to fix. Nothing will ever be the same again. "Another ideological god has failed," the dean of financial commentators, Martin Wolf, wrote in the Financial Times. Companies will "fundamentally reset" the way they work, said the CEO of General Electric, Jeffrey Immelt. "Capitalism will be different," said Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. No economic system ever remains unchanged, of course, and certainly not after a deep financial collapse and a broad global recession. But over the past few months, even though we've had an imperfect stimulus package, nationalized no banks and undergone no grand reinvention of capitalism, the sense of panic seems to be easing. Perhaps this is a mirage—or perhaps the measures taken by states around the world, chiefly the U.S. government, have restored normalcy. Every expert has a critique of specific policies, but over time we might see that faced with the decision to underreact or overreact, most governments chose the latter. That choice might produce new problems in due course—a topic for another essay—but it appears to have averted a systemic breakdown. There is still a long road ahead. There will be many more bankruptcies. Banks will have to slowly earn their way out of their problems or die. Consumers will save more before they start spending again. Mountains of debt will have to be reduced. American capitalism is being rebalanced, reregulated and thus restored. In doing so it will have to face up to long-neglected problems, if this is to lead to a true recovery, not just a brief reprieve. Many experts are convinced that the situation cannot improve yet because their own sweeping solutions to the problem have not been implemented. Most of us want to see more punishment inflicted, particularly on America's bankers. Deep down we all have a Puritan belief that unless they suffer a good dose of pain, they will not truly repent. In fact, there has been much pain, especially in the financial industry, where tens of thousands of jobs, at all levels, have been lost. But fundamentally, markets are not about morality. They are large, complex systems, and if things get stable enough, they move on. Consider our track record over the past 20 years, starting with the stock-market crash of 1987, when on Oct. 19 the Dow Jones lost 23 percent, the largest one-day loss in its history. The legendary economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that he just hoped that the coming recession wouldn't prove as painful as the Great Depression. It turned out to be a blip on the way to an even bigger, longer boom. Then there was the 1997 East Asian crisis, during the depths of which Paul Krugman wrote in a Fortune cover essay, "Never in the course of economic events—not even in the early years of the Depression—has so large a part of the world economy experienced so devastating a fall from grace." He went on to argue that if Asian countries did not adopt his radical strategy—currency controls—"we could be looking at the kind of slump that 60 years ago devastated societies, destabilized governments, and eventually led to war." Only one Asian country instituted currency controls, and partial ones at that. All rebounded within two years. Each crisis convinced observers that it signaled the end of some new, dangerous feature of the economic landscape. But often that novelty accelerated in the years that followed. The 1987 crash was said to be the product of computer trading, which has, of course, expanded dramatically since then. The East Asian crisis was meant to end the happy talk about "emerging markets," which are now at the center of world growth. The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998—which then–Treasury secretary Robert Rubin described as "the worst financial crisis in 50 years"—was meant to be the end of hedge funds, which then massively expanded. The technology bubble's bursting in 2000 was supposed to put an end to the dreams of oddball Internet startups. Goodbye, Pets.com; hello, Twitter. Now we hear that this crisis is the end of derivatives. Let's see. Robert Shiller, one of the few who predicted this crash almost exactly—and the dotcom bust as well—argues that in fact we need more derivatives to make markets more stable. A few years from now, strange as it may sound, we might all find that we are hungry for more capitalism, not less. An economic crisis slows growth, and when countries need growth, they turn to markets. After the Mexican and East Asian currency crises—which were far more painful in those countries than the current downturn has been in America—we saw the pace of market-oriented reform speed up. If, in the years ahead, the American consumer remains reluctant to spend, if federal and state governments groan under their debt loads, if government-owned companies remain expensive burdens, then private-sector activity will become the only path to create jobs. The simple truth is that with all its flaws, capitalism remains the most productive economic engine we have yet invented. Like Churchill's line about democracy, it is the worst of all economic systems, except for the others. Its chief vindication today has come halfway across the world, in countries like China and India, which have been able to grow and pull hundreds of millions of people out of poverty by supporting markets and free trade. Last month India held elections during the worst of this crisis. Its powerful left-wing parties campaigned against liberalization and got their worst drubbing at the polls in 40 years.

**Warming Rhetoric**

**Apocalyptic representations of climate change are good – induce activism**

**Veldman, 12**

(“Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” Ethics & the Environment Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2012)

As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus **only** on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8]

**Education about federal policies is key to check special interests from causing warming, and it’s low now**

Hansen, 9 – heads the [NASA](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA) [Goddard Institute for Space Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goddard_Institute_for_Space_Studies) and [adjunct professor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professors_in_the_United_States#Adjunct_professor) in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at [Columbia University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University) (James, December, Storms of My Grandchildren)

I believe **the biggest obstacle to solving global warming is** the role of **money in politics**, the undue sway of special interests. “But the influence of special interests is impossible to stop,” you say. It had better not be. But **the public, and young people in particular, will need to get involved in a major way.** “What?” you say. You already did get involved by working your tail off to help elect President Barack Obama. Sure, I (a registered Independent who has voted for both Republicans and Democrats over the years) voted for change too, and I had moist eyes during his Election Day speech in Chicago. That was and always will be a great day for America. But let me tell you: President **Obama** does not get it. He **and his** key **advisers are subject to heavy pressures**, and so far the approach has been, “Let’s compromise.” So you still have a hell of a lot of work ahead of you. You do not have any choice. Your attitude must be “Yes, we can.” I am sorry to say that **most of what politicians are doing on the climate front is greenwashing** – their proposals sound good, but they are deceiving you and themselves at the same time. **Politicians think that if matters look difficult, compromise is a good approach.** Unfortunately, nature and the laws of physics cannot compromise. They are what they are. **Policy decisions on climate change are being deliberated every day by those without full knowledge of the science, and often with intentional misinformation spawned by special interests.** This book was written to help rectify this situation. **Citizens** with a special interest—in their loved ones—**need to become familiar with the sci­ence, exercise their democratic rights, and pay attention to politi­cians' decisions. Otherwise**, it seems, **short-term special interests will hold sway in capitals around the world—and we are running out of time.**

**Heteronormativity**

**The alt cedes the political – key in the context of heteronormative change**

**Duggan 94 –** Lisa, Queering the State, Social Text, No. 39 (Summer, 1994), pp. 1-14

The problem for those of us engaged in queer scholarship and teaching, who have a stake in queer politics, is how to respond to these attacks at a moment when we have unprecedented opportunities (we are present in university curriculums and national politics as never before), yet confront perilous and paralyzing assaults. It is imperative that we respond to these attacks in the public arena from which they are launched. We cannot defend our teaching and scholarship without engaging in public debate and addressing the nature and operations of the state upon which our jobs and futures depend. In other words, the need to turn our attention to state politics is not only theoretical (though it is also that). It is time for queer intellectuals to concentrate on the creative production of strategies at the boundary of queer and nation-strategies specifically for queering the state.5

## 1AR

**FW**

**Prioritization of discourse destroys critique – discussing questions of implementation are key to progressive change**

Wendy Brown, Poli Sci and Women’s Studies @ Berkeley, ‘1 (Politics Out of History, p. 35-6)

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones – as speech codes of any sort do – not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

**State**

**The state can be redeemed!**

**Brubaker 4**

Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation: Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, [www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf](http://www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf)

This, then, is the basic work done by the category ‘nation’ in the context of nationalist movements—movements to create a polity for a putative nation. In other contexts, the category ‘nation’ is used in a very different way. It is used not to challenge the existing territorial and political order, but to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. This is the sort of work that is often called nation-building, of which we have heard much of late. It is this sort of work that was evoked by the Italian statesman Massimo D’Azeglio, when he famously said, ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’. It is this sort of work that was (and still is) undertaken—with varying but on the whole not particularly impressive degrees of success—by leaders of post-colonial states, who had won independence, but whose populations were and remain deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. It is this sort of work that the category ‘nation’ could, in principle, be mobilized to do in contemporary Iraq—to cultivate solidarity and appeal to loyalty in a way that cuts across divisions between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, North and South.2

In contexts like this, the category ‘nation’ can also be used in another way, not to appeal to a ‘national’ identity transcending ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, or ethnoregional distinctions, but rather to assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and thereby to define or redefine the state as the state of and for that core ‘nation’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 83ff). This is the way ‘nation’ is used, for example, by Hindu nationalists in India, who seek to redefine India as a state founded on Hindutva or Hinduness, a state of and for the Hindu ethnoreligious ‘nation’ (Van der Veer, 1994). Needless to say, this use of ‘nation’ excludes Muslims from membership of the nation, just as similar claims to ‘ownership’ of the state in the name of an ethnocultural core nation exclude other ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoracial groups in other settings.

In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, ‘nation’ can work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the rhetoric of the contemporary European far right (‘la France oux Franc¸ais’, ‘Deutschland den Deutshchen’). Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally inclusive way.3 It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of ‘the nation’, inclusively defined to include all citizens—and perhaps all long-term residents—of the state. To invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to transcend or at least relativize internal differences and distinctions. It is an attempt to get people to think of themselves— to formulate their identities and their interests—as members of that nation, rather than as members of some other collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical resource, though it is not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and humanities in the United States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such invocations of nationhood. They are often seen as de´passe´, parochial, naive, regressive, or even dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, ‘nation’ is a suspect category.

Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance, xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign policy. Unspeakable horrors—and a wide range of lesser evils—have been perpetrated in the name of the nation, and not just in the name of ‘ethnic’ nations, but in the name of putatively ‘civic’ nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of imagined communities as well—in the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith.

In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our time—the sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put it, nationalism is ‘the starkest political shame of the 20th-century’— there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category ‘nation’ was to economic, political, and cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category, and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4

The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages, images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to ‘cage’ (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic, cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous move ‘beyond the nation-state’. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe worked—and were intended—to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The ‘short twentieth century’ concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood.

Can one speak of an ‘unprecedented porosity’ of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects—especially with regard to the movement of people—social technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The world’s poor who seek to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 30–1, 267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today ‘on balance slightly less intensive’ than those of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clear—contrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest—that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domains—such as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behavior—the regulatory grip of the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 491–2).

The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from ‘methodological nationalism’ (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)—the tendency to take the ‘nation-state’ as equivalent to ‘society’, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks.

But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled— as it often is—with the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power.

The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state, should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations.

One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree with this point. No matter how open and ‘joinable’ a nation is—a point to which I will return below—it is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed, as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic resources.9

The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-state—the multiculturalist critique—itself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11). But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties.

In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good reasons—at least in the American context—for cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad nationalism neglect the intrinsic ambivalence and polymorphism of both. Patriotism and nationalism are not things with fixed natures; they are highly flexible political languages, ways of framing political arguments by appealing to the patria, the fatherland, the country, the nation. These terms have somewhat different connotations and resonances, and the political languages of patriotism and nationalism are therefore not fully overlapping. But they do overlap a great deal, and an enormous variety of work can be done with both languages. I therefore want to consider them together here.

I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy.

First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens, and therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument shares the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies allegedly ‘need’; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with largely passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in functionalist form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that does not make it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is conceived as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. Identification with fellow members of this imagined community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12

Patriotic identification with one’s country—the feeling that this is my country, and my government—can help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than disengagement from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of responsibility for such actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them; it may even generate powerful emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie and motivate opposition to government policies. Patriotic commitments are likely to intensify rather than attenuate such emotions. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, ‘you can feel shame over your country’s behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your country’.13 Patriotic commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate and sustain civic engagement.

**Nukes**

Fear of nuclear war is necessary to prevent its occurrence

Futterman, 94 – physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (J. A. H., “Obscenity and Peace: Meditations on the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Work,” 1994, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html)

I could say that if I didn't do it, someone else would, but that answer was rejected at Nuremberg. (It's also a better reason to leave the weapons program than to stay.) I continue to support the nuclear weapons business with my effort for many reasons, which I discuss throughout this piece. But mostly, I do it because the fear of nuclear holocaust is the only authority my own country or any other has respected so far when it comes to nationalistic urges to make unlimited war. As William L. Shirer states in his preface to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Touchstone Books, New York, 1990), "Adolf Hitler is probably the last of the great adventurer-conquerors in the tradition of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, and the Third Reich the last of the empires which set out on the path taken earlier by France, Rome and Macedonia. The curtain was rung down on that phase of history, at least, by the sudden invention of the hydrogen bomb, of the ballistic missile, and of rockets which can be aimed to hit the moon." Now this contrasts with the argument of those who would "reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship."[14] But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.